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ARTICLES
PARTIAL PATENTS
Gideon Parchomovsky* and Michael Mattioli**
In this Article, we propose a way to improve the workings of the patent
system.  Unlike most extant reform proposals that focus on the USPTO and
the Federal Circuit and the procedures they employ, our proposal is concep-
tual in nature.  We introduce two new intellectual property forms—“quasi-
patents” and “semi-patents.”  Both forms are designed to mitigate the social
costs of traditional patents by increasing the use and availability of new
inventions and research information.  Quasi-patents, as we define them,
would avail only against direct business competitors of the inventor, but not
against anyone else.  Semi-patents would have the same scope as traditional
patents, but their grant would be conditioned on an applicant’s consent to
publish all research information pertaining to the protected invention.  These
two new forms would complement, and not replace, traditional patents.
They would impose minimal administrative costs and would be compatible
with most extant proposals to reform the patent system.  Together, quasi-
patents and semi-patents could mitigate the costs of traditional patents on
subsequent inventors and thus open the path for more innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
In this Article, we introduce two new legal constructs—“quasi-
patents” and “semi-patents”—that are uniquely designed to spur innova-
tion through information sharing.  A “quasi-patent” is a form of intellec-
tual property that avails only against direct competitors.  Unlike a stan-
dard patent, which grants the holder absolute exclusivity and avails
against the rest of the world, a quasi-patent permits the owner to take
legal action only against direct competitors who utilize the invention
without permission, but not against other entities.  In contrast to quasi-
patents, “semi-patents,” as we define them, are similar in scope to tradi-
tional patents.  However, the grant of a semi-patent is conditioned on the
applicant’s agreement to publish all the research results and information
that pertain to the relevant application.
Both concepts offer more limited protection than standard patents,
albeit in different ways.  Relative to traditional patents, quasi-patents are
more limited in scope or, more precisely, in their enforceability.  The
holder of a quasi-patent would be able to bring infringement suits only
against direct competitors who produce, use, or sell1 the underlying in-
vention without permission.  Other entities, commercial and noncom-
mercial alike, would be at liberty to practice the invention without risking
legal liability.
As a result, inventions protected by quasi-patents could be put into a
much broader range of uses relative to inventions subject to traditional
patents.  To illustrate, consider a patent held by Nike on environmentally
friendly compositions of rubber and related production methods.2  The
invention could conceivably be useful for manufacturing a variety of
products unrelated to sneakers—for example, toothbrushes, which cur-
1. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of
the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”).
2. See U.S. Patent No. 7,211,611 (filed Dec. 11, 2003).
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rently clog landfills by the million.3  This potential will remain untapped,
however, if Nike and toothbrush makers lack sufficient economic motiva-
tion to explore licensing agreements.  In contrast, under a quasi-patent
regime, the rubber compositions and related methods could be freely
practiced by all firms that do not directly compete with Nike—including
the entire toothbrush industry.  Likewise, nonrival companies from other
industries and academic research institutions would be at liberty to use
the technology and improve upon it.  In the aggregate, such expansive
use privileges could bring new benefits to entire industries, and would
likely increase the rate and reduce the cost of generating future innova-
tion in our society.
Semi-patents differ from traditional patents in the threshold require-
ment—they are subject to an additional requirement of full information
sharing punishable by loss of protection.  At present, patent law imposes a
very minimal disclosure requirement:  It requires patentees to state how
their inventions are enabled by existing technology.4  As several commen-
tators have noted, under the existing regime, patentees have every incen-
tive to disclose as little as possible.5  A precondition for obtaining a semi-
patent, by contrast, would be mandatory disclosure of all the research
associated with the invention.  The comprehensive disclosure we envision
would include both positive (successful) and negative (failed) results.
Such disclosure can dramatically reduce research and development costs
for other inventors.  It can help them avoid unnecessary pitfalls and obvi-
ate duplicative research.  Indeed, it is widely accepted among both re-
searchers and policymakers that information sharing is the key to more
innovation.6  Yet, currently, the legal mechanism capable of inducing
knowledge sharing is wanting.  Semi-patents are intended to fill the void.
3. See Cleaning Up With Eco-Friendly Hygiene, USA Today (Magazine), Jan. 2005, at
76, 76 (noting toothbrush disposal produces approximately 50 million pounds of landfill
waste each year); Recycle Your Toothbrush, Environment, May 2000, at 5, 5 (same).
4. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”).
5. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 2135, 2150–51 (2009) [hereinafter Wagner, Patent-Quality] (discussing factors that
may motivate patentees to limit or defer clarity of their disclosures).
6. See, e.g., Dave A. Chokshi et al., Data Sharing and Intellectual Property in a
Genomic Epidemiology Network:  Policies for Large-Scale Research Collaboration, 84 Bull.
World Health Org. 382, 382–85 (2006) (discussing data sharing policies for genetic
research, and relationship between data and patenting in genomic science); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and Data-Sharing in Public Science, 15 Indus. & Corp. Change 1013,
1020–29 (2006) (discussing importance of data sharing in public science and related
challenges); Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits of
State-Sponsored Research:  Intellectual Property Rights and Data Sharing in California’s
Stem Cell Initiative, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1187, 1189 (2006) (“[Data] sharing and
aggregation facilitate observations that would otherwise be impossible . . . .”); see also The
White House, Open Government Initiative, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/open (on file
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The implementation of quasi-patents and semi-patents can be best
accomplished through a two-step approach.  First, quasi-patents and semi-
patents can be readily implemented in innovation-sharing collectives
where they can be introduced and enforced via licensing agreements.  In
recent years, a variety of cooperative efforts based on knowledge and pat-
ent sharing have developed across national and industrial borders.  Such
“communities of innovation,” as we term them, already use private li-
censes to limit patent rights.  Evidence suggests that these settings would
be ideal test beds for the models introduced in this Article.  Members of
such communities could contractually agree to refrain from seeking full
patent protection, and settle instead for the more limited protection of-
fered by quasi- or semi-patents.
The second phase would be to introduce quasi- and semi-patents
outside of the context of communities of innovation—namely, into the
general patent system.  Here, of course, one might ask why any inventor
would opt into less protection than the maximum degree accorded by the
law—that is, full patent protection.  One reason inventors prefer lesser
protection may be purely ideological.  If the emergence of Creative
Commons in the area of expressive works is to teach us anything, it is the
importance of ideological preference.  In the context of copyright law, a
multitude of creators have voluntarily agreed to cede many of the exclu-
sionary powers bestowed upon them by copyright law out of an ideologi-
cal belief in the importance of sharing.  We assume that, like creators, at
least some inventors value sharing highly enough to sacrifice some pro-
tection in order to further this goal.7  With that said, we are not so naı¨ve
as to believe that quasi- and semi-patents can compete against traditional
patents based on ideology alone.  Hence, we propose that policymakers
employ various incentives to induce inventors to select quasi- or semi-
patents over traditional ones.  Policymakers have a wide range of tools
that can be used toward this end, including lower examination fees for
quasi- and semi-patent applications, shorter review periods, fewer and
smaller renewal fees, extended protection terms, preferable tax treat-
with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 21, 2011) (collecting and publishing wealth
of raw data in accordance with new government initiative).
7. One might respond that we should not expect inventors to act in a similar fashion
because most expressive works are valueless whereas inventions are valuable.  We address
this argument in detail in Part IV, infra.  At this point, suffice it to say that this argument is
predicated on the false assumption that all inventions are valuable.  In fact, most patented
inventions are of little to no value.  See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical
Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (deducing
that large percentage of litigated patents are eventually held invalid); Yochai Benkler,
Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale L.J. 369, 435 (2002) (noting
“relatively small independent value” of “fine-grained contributions” to large-scale peer-
produced works); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1495, 1507 (2001) [hereinafter Lemley, Rational Ignorance] (estimating only five
percent of issued patents are litigated or licensed for royalty); see also Kimberly A. Moore,
Worthless Patents, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1521, 1545–52 (2005) (suggesting means of
identifying patent value).
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ment, or any combination thereof.  While the provision of such incentives
would carry institutional costs, we posit that these costs would be out-
weighed by the benefits that partial patents could bring, both in the form
of increased innovation and diminished burdens on our patent system as
a whole.
Put in the broader perspective of patent law scholarship, the intro-
duction of quasi- and semi-patents constitutes a different way to reform
the patent system and improve its workings.  Our proposal is consistent
with the reform-focused tenor of contemporary patent scholarship.8  But
most reform proposals in the extant academic literature focus on the
workings of two institutions:  the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) and the Federal Circuit.  The USPTO has been faulted for ap-
proving applications too leniently, while the Federal Circuit has been crit-
icized for upholding seemingly invalid patents.  Hence, several leading
commentators have called on both institutions to adopt stricter interpre-
tations of the threshold requirements for receiving patent protection,
thereby making it harder to obtain patents.9  Another group of theorists
has argued that a better way to improve the quality of patents is to raise
private costs for patentees by increasing patent examination and renewal
fees.  Raising the price of patent protection, so the argument goes, would
induce applicants to give up on low-value applications that are of rela-
tively low importance to society.10
Our proposal differs from other reform proposals in two important
respects.  First, it is voluntary in nature.  Second, it relies on “carrots,”
8. See generally James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure:  How Judges,
Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 3–4 (2008) [hereinafter Bessen & Meurer,
Patent Failure] (providing “first comprehensive empirical evaluation of the patent system’s
performance”); Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents 2 (2004)
[hereinafter Jaffe & Lerner, Discontents] (“[T]he patent system—intended to foster and
protect innovation—is generating waste and uncertainty that hinders and threatens the
innovative process.”); Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l Acads., A Patent System for the
21st Century 81–129 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter NRC, 21st
Century], available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309089107/html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (recommending improvements to current patent system).
9. See, e.g., Jaffe & Lerner, Discontents, supra note 8, at 171, 178–81 (discussing ways R
to improve patent quality); John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 492–93 (2003)
(suggesting stricter nonobviousness standard in some industries); Nancy T. Gallini, The
Economics of Patents:  Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform, J. Econ. Persp., Spring
2002, at 131, 147–48 (2002) (indicating weak review standards are to blame for prevalence
of patent thickets).
10. This argument assumes a strong positive correlation between private and social
value.  For a persuasive defense of this assumption, see Jonathan S. Masur, Process as
Purpose:  Costly Screens, Value Asymmetries, and Examination at the Patent Office, 2 J.
Legal Analysis (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 40–41), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105184 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(distinguishing argument that higher prices will buy stricter review from argument that
higher prices themselves work to filter out less valuable patents).
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rather than “sticks.”11  Essentially, all other proposals aim at making it
harder for applicants to obtain patent protection either directly, by levy-
ing higher fees on applicants, or indirectly, by requiring them to undergo
a stricter review process.  Our proposal, by contrast, seeks to induce appli-
cants to opt for less protection voluntarily by offering them a richer menu
of protection options and making full patent protection less attractive
relative to quasi- and semi-patents.  We achieve this by offering more
favorable treatment to quasi- and semi-patent applicants in order to re-
ward them for giving up some of the protection afforded to them by the
law.  Second, implementation of our proposal does not require a major
reform of the current regime.  In fact, in the context of communities of
innovation, the concepts of quasi- and semi-patents may be introduced
and implemented contractually without external intervention.  Admit-
tedly, a full-scale implementation would require the USPTO to recognize
two new categories of protection and provide incentives for applicants to
select them.  But these changes are quite minor and do not require a
massive investment of resources.
As a result of these two differences, our proposal is unlikely to meet
with strong opposition from any of the interest groups that shape patent
policies.  Our proposal does not erode inventors’ rights; on the contrary,
it gives them more choices and the possibility of better-tailored protec-
tion.  Likewise, our proposal does not require an overhaul of the USPTO.
It does not require patent examiners to undergo special training or mod-
ify the review process.  Finally, it does not necessitate significant expendi-
tures, and hence it is unlikely to be opposed by politicians—especially if
inventors will endorse it.  Consequently, from a practical standpoint, our
proposal is much more likely to be passed than other reform proposals.
A short caveat is in order here.  Our proposal is not a panacea, and
its implementation will not remedy all the ailments of the patent system.
We see it as a modest first step in the right direction.  Our proposal is
intended to complement, rather than substitute, other proposals.  Our
goal is to redesign the basic concepts, or building blocks, of which our
innovation system is made.  Other theorists have focused on ways to im-
prove the workings of the institutions that operationalize those concepts,
namely the USPTO and the Federal Circuit.  Hence, there is no rivalry
nor even conflict between our proposed system and other designs; there
are in fact opportunities for synergies.  For instance, existing proposals to
raise patent application fees could heighten the draw of quasi- and semi-
patents for some applicants.
This Article unfolds in four parts.  In Part I, we discuss the main
scholarly criticisms of the patent system and address the principal propos-
als for reform.  In Part II, we introduce the concepts of quasi-patents and
11. See generally Ian Ayres, Carrots and Sticks:  Unlock the Power of Incentives to Get
Things Done 24–28 (2010) [hereinafter Ayres, Carrots and Sticks] (discussing effectiveness
of contingent rewards and punishments in various contexts).
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semi-patents and review their theoretical underpinnings.  In Part III, we
explain how quasi- and semi-patents can enhance research in communi-
ties of innovation.  In Part IV, we explore possible ways of implementing
the concepts more broadly by offering these modes of protection as alter-
natives to traditional patent protection.  A brief conclusion follows.
I. THE PUSH TO SCALE BACK PATENTS
In this Part, we commence our analysis by reviewing the theoretic
literature on the U.S. patent system.  Since a comprehensive discussion of
the topic could fill volumes, we will confine our review to the main criti-
cisms of the patent system and the principal reform proposals.  As we will
show, most contemporary theorists are of the opinion that our patent
system is ill designed to support innovation, and some even suggest that it
has become a drag on innovation.
Most scholarly accounts have placed the blame for the sorry state of
the patent system on two institutions:  the USPTO and the Federal
Circuit.12  The USPTO, for its part, has lowered the threshold for secur-
ing patent protection, making it possible to obtain patents over almost
any invention, including many dubious ones.13  The Federal Circuit has
complemented the USPTO by protecting patents from legal challenges,
extending the reach of patent protection to such realms as business
methods, and awarding patentees excessive remedies against infringers.14
These changes have rendered patent protection overbroad and cumber-
some.  Not surprisingly, the USPTO and the Federal Circuit have thus
become the targets of most reform proposals.  In the following
paragraphs, we will elaborate on the criticisms of the patent system and
discuss the chief proposals for rekindling innovation.
A. The Overbreadth of Patents
Patent scholarship can be divided into two developmental stages.  In
the first stage, theorists focused on the static efficiency cost of patents on
consumers.  From this perspective, patent protection represented a trade-
off between dynamic and static efficiency.15  Patents spurred innovation
and hence enhanced dynamic efficiency.  However, they only did so at
the cost of a social deadweight loss.  Drawing on economic analysis of
monopolies, commentators have argued that the exclusivity afforded by
patents invariably leads patentees to restrict output and thereby charge
12. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. R
13. See infra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (noting recent rise in number of R
patents and concerns over rigor of patent review process).
14. See infra notes 32–36 and accompanying text (reviewing recent scholarship R
faulting Federal Circuit for making patents easier to enforce and harder to invalidate).
15. See Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 Stan. L. Rev.
863, 867 (2007) (discussing shift in scholarly focus from static to dynamic efficiency costs).
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supracompetitive prices for patented inventions.16  As a consequence,
some consumers who would have been willing to pay competitive prices
for patented products could not obtain them.  The foregone transactions
represented an efficiency loss that preoccupied the minds of patent
scholars.
Not surprisingly, this line of analysis led patent scholars to search for
mechanisms that would maximize research incentives while lessening the
short-term static efficiency costs patentees can generate.  The main mech-
anism scholars considered was compulsory licenses.17  The idea was to
take away from patentees the power to set the price of patented products
and processes and, instead, to vest this power in some third party—typi-
cally, an administrative agency, a specialized tribunal, or a court.18  Other
proposals called for the empowerment of consumers via organization
into purchase groups, which, in turn, would improve their bargaining po-
sition vis-a`-vis patentees.  Another option that received consideration was
to abandon patents altogether and replace them with a system of govern-
ment-sponsored prizes,19 or even auctions.20
16. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals:
Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 173, 177–78 (explaining patented drugs “are often sold in limited quantities at
supracompetitive prices” because “standard economic theory predicts that a profit-
maximizing producer with monopoly power will charge more and produce less than a
producer in a competitive market”).
17. See generally Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust:
The Role of Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 977, 1001–02 (1977) (discussing
patent compulsory licensing scheme); Pankaj Tandon, Optimal Patents with Compulsory
Licensing, 90 J. Pol. Econ. 470, 470–74 (1982) (same); Cole M. Fauver, Comment,
Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States:  An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 Nw.
J. Int’l L. & Bus. 666, 668–74, 683–85 (1988) (same).
18. Effectively, the introduction of compulsory licenses substitutes a patentee’s
property rule protection for liability rule protection.  For more on property and liability
rules, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972); see also Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
19. See John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 37, 39, 41–51 (2004) (analyzing proposed intellectual property subsidies
within broader theoretical framework of public utility regulation); Steven Shavell &
Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & Econ. 525, 525
(2001) (concluding “intellectual property rights system does not enjoy any fundamental
advantage over the reward system”).
20. See Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts:  A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation,
113 Q.J. Econ. 1137, 1146–48 (1998) (describing system in which auction process would be
employed to determine value of patent buyout price); see also Michael Abramowicz,
Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 115, 148–58 (2003) (discussing, inter alia,
Kremer’s auction-based proposal); Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races
over Auctions, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 803, 844–53 (2007) (discussing various patent auction
designs); Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplace for Ideas?, 84 Tex. L. Rev.
395, 419 (2005) (suggesting system in which right to develop registered idea is auctioned
to highest bidder); Chris J. Katopis, Perfect Happiness?:  Game Theory as a Tool for
Enhancing Patent Quality, 10 Yale J.L. & Tech. 360, 397 (2008) (“The auction helps weed
out those patents of foreseeably little economic value or industrial importance.”).
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Stage two, as we call it, was marked by an important shift in scholarly
focus.  Over time, commentators turned their attention away from the
deadweight loss of patents and concentrated instead on the impact of
patents on subsequent innovation.21  The core question was starkly sim-
ple:  Does our patent system, in its current design, spur or hinder innova-
tion?  To answer this question, scholars began to closely examine the pat-
ent system at large, its institutions, and their practices.  A sharp increase
in patent application and issuance rates prompted concerns about the
rigor of review at the USPTO,22 and a rise in patent litigation rates led
some to believe that Federal Circuit jurisprudence had inspired more liti-
gation than innovation.23
Between 1990 and 2009, the number of U.S. patent filings nearly
tripled from 176,264 to 482,871, and the number of patents grew from
99,077 to 191,927.24  Careful studies have concluded that the USPTO’s
examination process may be partly responsible for this dramatic increase.
Recent studies estimate that the percentage of applications that mature
into patents is higher than seventy percent, with some commentators sug-
gesting that the rate is actually as high as eighty-five percent.25  This high
approval rate, combined with the fact that, on average, examiners spend
about eighteen hours on each patent application, has led scholars to dis-
cern a lack of rigor in the USPTO’s review process.26  But the evidence
21. See Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 15, at 867 (discussing this broad shift in R
focus of patent scholarship).
22. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State:  The Patent
Office’s Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2051, 2057–59 (2009)
[hereinafter Rai, Growing Pains] (discussing recently increased workload and patent
backlog at USPTO).
23. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1, 56 (2005) (noting that, although patent litigation rates do not appear to have increased
overall, “the rate of such litigation is rising among small firms and firms with smaller total
patents”).  But see Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Enforcing Intellectual Property
Rights 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8656, 2001), available at
http://nber.org/papers/w8656.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he growth
in patenting has been comparable to the growth in litigation . . . .”).
24. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years
1963–2009 (2010), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
25. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58
Emory L.J. 181, 201 (2008) (noting USPTO “grants patents to more than 70% of those who
apply”); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Ogden H. Webster & Richard Eichmann, Continuing Patent
Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office—Extended, 12
Fed. Cir. B.J. 35, 38 (2002) (discussing different methods of estimating grant rate and
estimating adjusted grant rate in which patents were granted on both parent and
continuing applications at eighty-five percent).
26. See, e.g., Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 7, at 5–6 (citing average figure R
of eighteen hours); cf. Patent Nonsense, Economist, Apr. 8, 2000, at 78 (citing average
figure of eight hours); Amit Asaravala, Dodgy Patents Rile Tech Industry, Wired, Apr. 5,
2004, at http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2004/04/62930 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (quoting Brigid Quinn, USPTO spokesperson, as stating that patent
examiners spend average of thirty hours reviewing software patents).
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goes beyond statistics alone; the issuance of dubious patents has also be-
come a common topic of discussion in popular media.27
Critics note the USPTO’s funding structure has undoubtedly con-
tributed to the high levels of patent issuance.  Legislation in the early
1990s switched the office’s source of funding from taxpayer dollars to
fees paid by applicants.28  As economists Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner ex-
plain, by adopting this system, the USPTO developed new financial incen-
tives to issue more patents.29  In effect, patent applicants went from being
“candidates” to “customers.”30  Contemporary scholarship portrays the
USPTO as overworked, underfunded, and understaffed.31
But responsibility doesn’t fall on the shoulders of the USPTO alone:
The Federal Circuit has attracted criticism from legal scholars for ex-
panding/broadening patent rights to a degree that has contributed to
the rising tide of filings.  Critics often cite decisions that extended the
range of eligible subject matter to include, inter alia, business methods,
software, and human genes.32  Similarly, the court has been faulted for
narrowing the standards of obviousness,33 broadening the ways patentees
27. See, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, Amazon Sues Big Bookseller Over System for Shopping,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1999, at C1 (discussing suit over Amazon’s “one-click” shopping
patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997)); Pete Williams, Smuckers in Legal
Jam Over PB&J Patent, Nightly News (NBC television broadcast Apr. 6, 2005), available at
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7408857 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
potential patent for “sealed crustless” peanut butter and jelly, U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596
(filed Dec. 8, 1997)).
28. See Jaffe & Lerner, Discontents, supra note 8, at 11 (discussing USPTO funding R
changes).
29. See id. (“[T]he PTO views itself as an organization whose mission is to serve
patent applicants.  And, of course, what applicants want is for their applications to be
granted.”).
30. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Working for Our Customers:  A Patent and
Trademark Office Review 1, 3 (1994), at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/1994
annualreport_pg1-5.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (referring to applicants as
“customers”).
31. See Jaffe & Lerner, Discontents, supra note 8, at 131 (discussing rising number of R
patents per examiner); see also Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive
in the Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55
Emory L.J. 61, 67–68 & n.29 (2006) (discussing incentives within USPTO that lead to
issuance of low quality patents).  Consistent descriptions are legion in the press.  See, e.g.,
Simson L. Garfinkel, Patently Absurd, Wired, July 1994, at 104, 108 (discussing examiner
quotas and job burnout); Lawrence D. Maloney, Patent Office Faces Backlog Crisis, Design
News (Mass.), Jan. 10, 2005, at 27 (discussing increasing workload examiners face and
common practice of working unpaid overtime).
32. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (establishing “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test (quoting In
re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994))); cf. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226
(2010) (stating satisfying “machine-or-transformation” test is not sole indicium of
patentability and refusing to categorically exclude business method or software patents).
33. See, e.g., Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 10–11, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350)
(arguing Federal Circuit has made obviousness standard too strict); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Obvious to Whom?  Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 Berkeley
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can prove nonobviousness,34 and expanding the awards available to pat-
entees.35  On balance, recent scholarship posits that the Federal Circuit
has made patents easier to enforce and harder to invalidate.  And so, the
practices of two governmental bodies have fueled what many scholars call
a patent “crisis.”36
But is there truly a cause for such alarm?  After all, it may be argued
that stronger patent rights a fortiori lead to more innovation, and that
the spike in the number of filings is living proof of this hypothesis.37  Un-
fortunately, studies indicate that the recent rise in patenting does not
stem from greater investments in research and development, or more sig-
nificant innovations, but rather, from a deliberate effort on the part of
firms to maximize the size of their patent holdings.38  Recent examina-
tions show that under the USPTO’s lax review standards, applicants ex-
tract value from the patent system by filing high numbers of low-quality
applications.39  Among other things, this lowers the usefulness of patents
as “screens” for important innovations.40
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the recent strengthening of
patent rights has created a financial drag on innovation.  Patent litiga-
tion, once a modest concern for many firms, has developed into a signifi-
cant business cost for corporations over the past thirty years.41  The num-
Tech. L.J. 885, 888–89 (2004) (documenting and critiquing diminished consideration of
PHOSITAs in Federal Circuit obviousness determinations and suggesting new approach);
John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 771, 773 (2003)
(explaining why, although lenient nonobviousness standard holds some immediate
advantages for patent applications, it allows for greater number of low-quality patents).
34. See Teleflex, 550 U.S. at 426–27 (changing focus of obviousness determinations to
knowledge and abilities of persons of ordinary skill in the art); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d
994, 998–1000 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (setting forth that obviousness can be defeated by
“suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine,” now commonly known as the “teaching-
suggestion-motivation” (TSM) test); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Courts and
the Patent System, Regulation, Summer 2009, at 18, 21 (discussing Teleflex decision).
35. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (extending
range of lost profits available in cases of infringement).
36. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How Courts Can
Solve It (2009).
37. Jaffe & Lerner, Discontents, supra note 8, at 11–12 (explaining and refuting this R
argument); see also Bessen & Meurer, Patent Failure, supra note 8, at 145–46 (explaining R
and refuting related or analogous arguments that patent system is working).
38. See, e.g., Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 15, at 868 (discussing conscious effort R
by firms to “maximize the number of patents per R&D dollar”).
39. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 23, at 17, 52 (“[F]irms patent heavily not to R
realize the value of individual patents, but to purchase the advantages of the aggregation of
these individual patents into patent portfolios.”); Wagner, Patent-Quality, supra note 5, at R
2138 (presenting question of why patentees increasingly follow a high-volume, low-quality
approach to patenting).
40. See Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 15, at 865 (discussing scholarly focus on R
reforming patent system to act as better screen).
41. Different methodologies place the average cost of litigation within a wide range.
According to the AIPLA, the direct legal costs of a typical patent lawsuit are about $5
million.  See Bessen & Meurer, Patent Failure, supra note 8, at 132 (explaining that cases R
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ber of patent lawsuits nearly doubled between 1988 and 2001.42
Corporations in the pharmaceutical, computer software, and semicon-
ductor industries frequently set aside annual litigation budgets of mil-
lions of dollars—funds that arguably would be better spent on research
and development of drugs or other useful technologies.43  The human
toll of patent litigation has also not gone ignored by scholars.44  When
scientists and engineers are compelled to serve as witnesses, they are
often removed from pursuing their professional endeavors for weeks,
months, and sometimes years.45
The costs of litigation reach beyond plaintiffs and defendants.
Surveys and practitioner accounts show that the risks of litigation and the
potentially high costs of investigating existing patents deter many firms
from pursuing certain lines of research and development in the first
place.46  The deterrent is strongest for small fledglings that cannot risk
the chance of a lawsuit.47  Similar anecdotal evidence, supported by some
limited empirical evidence, suggests that the rate of settlement in patent
that go to trial typically cost several million dollars for each side); Lemley, Rational
Ignorance, supra note 7, at 1502 (estimating total annual amount spent on patent R
litigation to be $2.1 billion); Bart Showalter, Presentation at AIPLA Mid-Winter
Conference:  Cost of Patent Litigation (Jan. 25, 2008), available at http://www.aipla.org/
Content/ContentGroups/Speaker_Papers/Mid-Winter1/20083/Showalter-slides.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (citing median 2007 cost figure of $5 million when more
than $25 million is at stake in a patent suit).  Experts note that costs can sharply rise when
more money is at stake, especially during discovery stages.  Stuart J.H. Graham & Dietmar
Harhoff, Can Post-Grant Reviews Improve Patent System Design?  A Twin Study of US and
European Patents 5 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 5680, 2006),
available at www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP5680.asp (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
42. NRC, 21st Century, supra note 8, at 32; cf. Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, R
Enforcement of Patent Rights in the United States, in Patents in the Knowledge-Based
Economy 145, 145–46 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (noting increase
in patent lawsuits, but overall rate of suit filings per issued patent has been constant).
43. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
577, 592 (1999) [hereinafter Merges, Impossible Patents] (citing “foregone research
opportunities” among indirect costs of patent litigation).
44. See, e.g., James W. Brady, Jr. & Edward A. Meilman, Questions Boards of Directors
Should Ask the Head of Their Intellectual Property Operation, Intell. Asset Mgmt.,
available at http://www.buildingipvalue.com/n_us/106_109.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 21, 2011) (“The toll on human resources and
disruption of the company’s business when attention is diverted to discovery and other
litigation tasks also can be significant.”).
45. See Bessen & Meurer, Patent Failure, supra note 8, at 132 (2008) (discussing such R
business costs).
46. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 699 (1998) (discussing how
“specter of rights” surrounding patent may discourage risk-averse product developers and
investors); Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 42, at 146 (noting small firms avoid R
research and development in areas where litigation risk is high).
47. Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 42, at 159 (explaining why large firms are R
better suited to weather patent litigation as compared to small firms).
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cases is heightened by this deterrent effect.48  While litigation is a neces-
sary and important aspect of any privately enforced property regime, the
view prevails in academia and in mass media that the frequency and scale
of patent lawsuits have become cause for concern.49
A final and less obvious consequence of the overbreadth of patents
stems from their potential for strategic misuse.  For example, today it is
common for multiple firms to hold overlapping patents that cover a sin-
gle product or technology.  The power of such “patent thickets” to dis-
courage competition in important industries, such as computer software
and pharmaceuticals, and the related issue of predatory “patent trolls”
have become common themes in patent policy discourse.50
B. Extant Proposals for Reform
Like global climate change, the scope and causes of the patent prob-
lem are difficult to precisely measure, but experts generally agree that
solutions are needed quickly.  Tracing the problem back to its roots,
many scholars believe that innovation can be repaired through institu-
tional reforms in the USPTO and Federal Circuit.  The most common
proposals typically fall into three categories:  improving the quality of re-
view at the USPTO, charging patent holders higher fees, and encourag-
ing stricter standards within the Federal Circuit.
Scholars generally agree that stricter review of patent applications
would not only yield better patents, but would also likely discourage the
filing of dubious applications.  More precise review could be achieved by
tightening threshold standards for patentability,51 and by having examin-
ers spend more time reviewing fewer applications.  Easing these pressures
would require hiring more examiners and improving the USPTO’s
processing capabilities—measures that would require significant funds.
As a result, a rich body of scholarship has developed on what additional
resources the USPTO needs.52
48. Id.
49. Michael Fitzgerald, A Patent Is Worth Having, Right?  Well, Maybe Not, N.Y.
Times, July 15, 2007, at B3 (discussing litigation costs exceeding patent profits).
50. Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 15, at 867–76 (2007) (discussing patent R
thickets); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket:  Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 Innovation Policy and the Economy 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe et al.
eds., 2001), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (same).
51. See Bessen & Meurer, Patent Failure, supra note 8, at 248 (discussing tightening R
standard for obviousness in USPTO).
52. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving
Patent Quality One Technology at a Time:  The Case of Business Methods, 21 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 729, 785 (2006) (analyzing how USPTO initiative to improve review required
substantial resources); Rai, Growing Pains, supra note 22, at 2066 (suggesting additional R
“[c]ompensatory benefits in the form of higher salaries or substantially improved
information-technology tools”); Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform:  Economic Analysis
and Critique, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1017, 1036 (2004) (evaluating funding based on
USPTO’s “production function”); Mark Lemley, Douglas Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat,
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Other proposals focus on the amount of information available to ex-
aminers.  Studies show that examiners working in isolation are often una-
ble to locate and analyze every possible prior art reference that might
render a patent invalid.53  One innovative solution to this information
deficit is Professor Noveck’s “Peer to Patent Project,” a pilot program at
the USPTO which enlisted the general public to collect and rate prior art
with the aid of a collaborative website.54  In a similar vein, economists
Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner propose a system of “pre-grant opposition” in
which the public would submit evidence of invalidating prior art before
any patent is granted.55
An opposing school of thought holds that patents should be scruti-
nized ex post.  Post-grant reexamination procedures are available in the
United States in two forms:  (1) ex parte reexaminations in which third-
party challengers are removed from the process (even if they initiate the
proceedings), and (2) inter partes reexamination, in which challengers
are permitted to participate.56  However, existing reexaminations are lim-
ited in several ways:  They can only be initiated if new prior art is discov-
ered, or if a substantial new question concerning old prior art comes up,
and only some kinds of evidence can be used to prove invalidity.57  Aca-
demics and policymakers have recently proposed new post-grant review
mechanisms that would allow for more meaningful scrutiny.  For exam-
ple, the FTC has proposed permitting post-grant challenges based on is-
sues of novelty, nonobviousness, written description, enablement, and
utility.58  Recent academic and legislative proposals echo these sugges-
tions.59  Legal and economic experts believe that a post-grant system with
What to Do About Bad Patents?, Regulation, Winter 2005–2006, at 10, 10 (2005) (“The
obvious solution would be to throw money at the problem.”).  But see Lemley, Rational
Ignorance, supra note 7, at 1510 (arguing it may be economically optimal to address low R
quality “ex post, [when] the patent is asserted in litigation”).  Recent reform proposals in
Congress support this idea as well.  See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 5
(2009) (proposing expansion of post-grant review).
53. Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”:  Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and
Patent Reform, 20 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 123, 135–38 (2006) (discussing information deficit in
patent office).
54. The Peer to Patent project was carried out as a USPTO pilot project.  Peer to
Patent, at http://www.peertopatent.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
55. Jaffe & Lerner, Discontents, supra note 8, at 180. R
56. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–307 (2006) (ex parte reexaminations); 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318
(inter partes reexamination).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 301 (limiting prior art eligible for consideration during
reexamination to patents or printed publications); 35 U.S.C. § 304 (requiring substantial
new question of patentability to be raised).
58. Fed. Trade Comm’n, To Promote Innovation:  The Proper Balance of
Competition and Patent Law and Policy 8 n.26 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
59. NRC, 21st Century, supra note 8, at 101; see also Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. R
515, 111th Cong., § 5 (2009) (allowing for evidence of prior use or prior sale in addition to
evidence of prior art in a post-grant challenge).
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such features could reduce the need for costly litigation, as well as the
number of patents that draw undeserved licensing fees.60
Shifting focus from examiners to applicants, reformers believe that
increasing the cost of patenting would also help to stem the patent tide.
A direct way to discourage overly zealous patenting would involve raising
threshold application fees.  Proponents of this approach believe that a
steep application fee would act as a “costly screen,” forcing applicants to
consider, ex ante, whether the expected benefits of their idea exceed the
costs.61  However, others note that this approach could unfairly block
small firms from obtaining patents in the first place.62  A popular alterna-
tive proposal solves this problem by keeping application fees low, but rais-
ing renewal costs.63  The main advantage of this approach is that it has
the potential to eliminate “deadwood” without discouraging new entrants
with valuable inventions.64
There are numerous suggestions that the Federal Circuit scale back
the range of subject matter eligible for patentability.  Patents covering
software and abstract business methods have long been a focal point in
such proposals.  Citing software patents as uncertain in scope, often
vague, obvious, sometimes profoundly difficult to analyze for infringe-
ment, and yet frequently litigated, critics have called on the Federal
Circuit to dictate tighter standards for software patentability, or to abolish
software patents altogether.65  Genetic patents have received similar criti-
cisms.66  Many basic tools of genetic research are locked up in patents, a
situation that many believe continues to impede medical research.67
60. Graham & Harhoff, supra note 41, at 4 (concluding that post-grant review would R
“allow for large welfare gains”).  But see Bessen & Meurer, Patent Failure, supra note 8, at R
223–25 (agreeing that expanded post-grant review system would raise social welfare, but
questioning degree to which it would reduce drag of costly litigation).
61. See Masur, supra note 10 (manuscript at 17–18) (discussing potential upside to R
increased costs).
62. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting:  The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104
Mich. L. Rev. 1559, 1577 (2006) (arguing “application fees should be low enough to attract
patenting by all inventors”).
63. Bessen & Meurer, Patent Failure, supra note 8, at 247. R
64. Id.
65. See Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited:  The Case Against Patent Protection for
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 Emory L.J. 1025,
1135–40 (1990) (proposing sole reliance on copyrights, not patents, to protect software).
Some critics say the Federal Circuit has improperly disregarded restrictions on abstract
claims.  See Bessen & Meurer, Patent Failure, supra note 8, at 187, 201, 210–13 R
(“Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has set software-specific precedents that essentially
remove most restrictions on abstract claims in software.”).
66. See, e.g., Jon. F. Merz, Discoveries:  Are There Limits on What May Be Patented?,
in Who Owns Life? 99, 99–101 (David Magnus et al. eds., 2002) (discussing who can and
should rightfully own genetic discoveries).
67. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 46, at 698 (“A proliferation of intellectual R
property rights upstream may be stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the
course of research and product development.”).
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Some commentators also believe the Federal Circuit should ease the
standards of obviousness.  Obvious inventions, so the argument goes, will
always be produced regardless of whether they are patentable.  So, pat-
ents should be reserved only for nonobvious ideas.68  There is reason to
believe that a tighter nonobviousness standard would also lower the num-
ber of trivial patents, thus making it easier for innovators to conduct
clearance searches.69  Once again, computer software and gene-based
patents feature prominently in the campaign for such reforms.  Studies
show that prior art in the realm of software is often unavailable to exam-
iners, suggesting that software patents are not accurately screened for ob-
viousness.70  In the field of genetic science, the Federal Circuit has devel-
oped special rules that make obviousness particularly difficult to prove.71
A final standard cited as ripe for reform is the Federal Circuit’s pre-
sumption that issued patents are valid.  Under current law, any chal-
lenger must prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that a patent is
invalid.72  By contrast, patentees can establish infringement “by a prepon-
derance of the evidence”—a lower standard.73  Thus, at trial, the eviden-
tiary balance falls in favor of patent holders.  Scholars reason that, given
the USPTO’s extremely lax review standards, this level of deference for
issued patents is unwarranted.  Many believe that the playing field should
be leveled, by courts either abandoning the presumption of validity or
lowering the necessary standard of proof.74  To the same end, scholars
have proposed new rules that would expand the range of evidence that
could be used to prove invalidity.75
In sum, it can be said that although there is a wide range of opinions
about precisely how to reform the patent system, there is virtual consen-
sus that at least some reform is needed.  Viewed together, extant propos-
68. Bessen & Meurer, Patent Failure, supra note 8, at 248. R
69. Id. at 236.
70. See Merges, Impossible Patents, supra note 43, at 589–90 (discussing R
unavailability of prior art in software industry).
71. NRC, 21st Century, supra note 8, at 91–95 (“[A]n invention is only obvious and R
unpatentable when the obvious route to try is coupled with a ‘reasonable expectation of
success.’”); see also Barton, supra note 9, at 492–93 (suggesting nonobviousness standard R
should be raised in certain industries); cf. Robert M. Hunt, Nonobviousness and the
Incentive to Innovate:  An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Reform 37–38 (Dep’t
of Research & Statistics, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 99-3, 1999),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=160674 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (proposing different nonobviousness standards for different
industries).
72. See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, 174 F.3d 1308, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
73. See, e.g., Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836, 842 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
74. But see Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation:  The “Dubious
Preponderance,” 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 923, 925–41 (2004) (calling into question
arguments for altering standards associated with presumption of validity).
75. See Jaffe & Lerner, Discontents, supra note 8, at 188 (arguing parties to R
reexamination “should be able to bring forward any relevant factual evidence”).
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als for reform are, by and large, “sticks” rather than “carrots”:76  They
address the patent problem by placing additional burdens on patent ap-
plicants.  In some cases, the burdens are direct, as in the proposals for
increasing application and renewal fees.  In other proposals that call for
stricter standards on the issuance and judicial review of patents, the bur-
dens are less direct but potentially just as powerful.  In the following Part,
we advance a fundamentally different approach to rekindling the embers
of innovation.
II. INTRODUCING QUASI-PATENTS AND SEMI-PATENTS
In this Part, we wish to highlight a different way of improving the
workings of the patent system and, consequently, the rate and quality of
innovation in our society.  Instead of focusing on institutions—namely,
the USPTO and the Federal Circuit—or the procedures they employ—
particularly, the examination process and the appropriate standard of ap-
pellate review—we put the premium on the concepts, or legal constructs,
that underlie our patent system.
At present, our patent system is predicated on a binary, one-size-fits-
all, design.  Inventors can choose between no protection and full patent
protection.  The Patent Act provides no intermediate positions.  Of
course, patentees can privately create intermediate protection contractu-
ally.  But as Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith famously demonstrated,
standardization is a critical element in the world of property.77  Since
property rights are rights in rem that avail against the rest of the world,
the formalization and protection of property rights imposes costs on mul-
tiple third parties.78  Standardization reduces information costs for third
parties and hence economizes on valuable resources.  Merrill and Smith
used this insight to explain the closed enumeration (numerus clausus)
principle that characterizes property systems.79  Moreover, Merrill and
Smith have shown the importance of optimal standardization—that is, of
fashioning optimal menus of rights and duties.80
While we do not presume to know what the optimal standardization
of patent rights is, we posit that the current binary design that employs
uniform protection is socially suboptimal.  We further submit that the in-
troduction of new protection modes to the menu of options available to
patentees can improve social welfare.  Giving inventors more choice can
help reduce the drag patents create on future innovation.  As we will
show, a richer menu of protection modes can better align private and
76. See Ayres, Carrots and Sticks, supra note 11, at 24–26 (discussing economic theory R
of contingent reward and punishment).
77. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property:  The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000) (“[U]nusual property
rights increase[ ] the cost of processing information about all property rights.”).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 26–35.
80. Id. at 38–40.
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social welfare.  Naturally, the precise effect of a richer protection menu
depends on the design of the new protection options.
We propose adding two new categories of legal protection, which we
dub quasi-patents and semi-patents.  Although these options are mutually
distinct, both models are designed to allow for more expansive uses of
inventions and better information sharing.  Viewed from the vantage
point of potential patentees, the two new options we seek to add to the
menu offer more limited protection than standard patents.
As Yair Listokin, who studied menus in the context of corporate law,
has demonstrated, legal defaults and menus have an important effect on
actors’ choices.  Listokin found that actors tend to adopt default arrange-
ments provided by the legislature, even though they can modify them
contractually.  He particularly noted that the inclusion of an opt-in ar-
rangement in a statutory menu increases the likelihood that it will be
adopted relative to a purely contractual regime.81  Likewise, Ian Ayres has
argued that “[l]awmakers . . . might affect contractual equilibria” through
the use of menus.82  Like Listokin, Ayres posited that the provision of “an
express statutory menu” can be used to channel actors’ behavior and con-
cluded emphatically that “menus matter.”83  There is good reason to ex-
pect, therefore, that the creation of a statutory menu consisting of tradi-
tional patents, as well as quasi-patents and semi-patents, will alter the
existing equilibrium in the patent world.  But before we fully specify how
this change is to take place, we first need to present the concepts of quasi-
and semi-patents.
A. Background Property Theory
In facing the challenge of calibrating patent protection to the most
socially desirable level, policymakers can find valuable guidance in prop-
erty theory.  Changing the scope of the holder’s rights or reconfiguring
the asset to which the rights apply can often address problems of optimal
protection.84  The various changes in a property owner’s right to exclude
constitute a useful illustration and a potential blueprint for patent law.
The exclusion rights of real property owners have been contracted in va-
rious ways in response to changing social needs.  For example, the exclu-
sion powers of land owners have been restricted with respect to workers
81. Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do?  An Empirical
Examination 6 (Yale Law Sch., Research Paper No. 335, 2007), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=924578 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting fifty percent of
corporations in Georgia, which has a menu statute, opt-in to fair price protection, as
opposed to twenty percent in states that allow this option but do not include it in a
statutory menu).
82. Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3, 3 (2006).
83. Id. at 3, 5.
84. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three
Dimensions, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1015, 1017 (2008) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky,
Property in Three Dimensions] (“[T]he overall concept of the property right must be
adjusted accordingly in order to maintain maximum benefit from property rights.”).
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of relief organizations85 and law enforcement agencies.86  Furthermore,
lawmakers in the United Kingdom and Norway have recognized a right to
roam in the general public, and have thereby restricted the exclusion
powers of property owners.87
Similarly, both lawmakers and rights-holders can reconfigure or
redefine assets when they deem it socially desirable.  Assets are continu-
ously reconfigured to fit the complexities of a dynamic economy with
changing preferences.  For example, the optimal size of a residential par-
cel in large metropolitan areas is very different today than it was in the
past.  Likewise, zoning and height restrictions have become common-
place.88  Finally, the government may reconfigure parcels for preserva-
tion purposes by taking various interests, ranging from easements to fee
simple absolute, in private land.89
To facilitate asset reconfiguration, lawmakers often employ the strat-
egy of creating fictional assets.90  A prime example of this is the “reifica-
tion” of property rights in Anglo-American law as manifested by the estate
system.  Indeed, from a legal standpoint, “X” does not own the proverbial
Blackacre, but rather owns a fee simple interest in Blackacre.91  In the area
of intellectual property that deals with intangible and abstract subject
matter, effectively all assets are fictional.  The use of “fictional asset[s]
permits adherence to the ideal package of ownership, asset, and domin-
ion by configuring the asset into a form amenable to the standard prop-
erty package.”92  More importantly for our purposes, it also permits ad-
ding or subtracting features from the definition of the right.
It bears emphasis that our goal is not to mount a facial attack on
traditional patents.  Indeed, we do not seek to redefine the package of
rights and powers associated with a patent grant.  Rather, our goal is to
85. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371–72 (N.J. 1971).
86. See generally Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude:  Public
Accommodation and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1283, 1450 (1996) (“[A]ll rights—
even the basic right to exclude—are limited by the rights of others and by social
interests.”).
87. See Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam:  Redefining the Landowner’s
Bundle of Sticks, 19 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 375, 404 (2007) (discussing right to roam in
Britain, and referring to similar rights in Sweden, Finland, and Norway).
88. See generally William A. Fischel, The Economics of Zoning Laws:  A Property
Rights Approach to American Land Use Controls 21–23 (1985) (“Virtually every general-
purpose local government in the United States has the authority to adopt zoning and
related police power regulations.”); Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air, or
Manhattanization?:  Communal Aesthetics in Zoning Central City Real Estate
Development, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 445, 454–67 (1998) (discussing building height restrictions
in various cities).
89. See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, Property in Three Dimensions, supra note 84, at R
1018 (discussing government takings and related reconfigurations of property rights).
90. Id. at 1046–49.
91. Id. at 1048 (“Under the estate system, an owner of real property never owns the
underlying realty, but rather an estate in the realty.”).
92. Id. at 1047.
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give inventors more choice by crafting two additional opt-in regimes, the
first of which can be dubbed a quasi-patent.
B. Quasi-Patents
A quasi-patent, as we define it, is a form of property protection that
avails only against competitors.  The holder of a quasi-patent will have all
the rights (and duties) the Patent Act accords, but she may only enforce
them against businesses and individuals that directly compete with her.
Accordingly, a quasi-patent limits the list of potential defendants against
whom infringement actions can be brought.  The narrowing down of the
group of potential infringers can be thought of as a restriction of the
owner’s dominion, or alternatively, as a reconfiguration of the bundle of
rights and powers known as a patent right.  Either way, it leads to the
same outcome:  More people will be able to use the underlying invention
free of charge and without fearing legal sanctions.  By conferring the
same rights and powers as a regular patent, while limiting the number of
people subject to those rights and powers, a quasi-patent largely preserves
inventors’ incentives to innovate, and at the same time, enables wide-
spread use of the invention by noncompetitors.
Quasi-patents can be thought of as a form of quasi-property, a con-
cept introduced by the Supreme Court in the classic case of International
News Service v. Associated Press.93  That case involved a dispute between two
large agencies in the waning days of World War I.  The plaintiff,
Associated Press (AP), a cooperative network of newspapers based in the
East, sued the International News Service (INS) for extracting the under-
lying facts of AP news reports and sending them by telegraph to Western
affiliates as original news articles.94  In essence, the Court faced the same
challenge that is presented to us by the contemporary patent system:  how
to balance incentives to create against the anticompetitive effects of tradi-
tional intellectual property protection (in this case, copyright).  Writing
for the majority, Justice Pitney refused to grant AP full copyright protec-
tion in its news.  Nevertheless, the majority ruled in AP’s favor based in-
stead on a concept that it called “quasi-property”—a federal common law
right of exclusion to fresh news that may only be exercised against com-
petitors, but not against the general public.95  The Court maintained that
the use of quasi-property in this case would preserve AP’s—and other
news agencies’—incentive to gather news without unduly restricting the
dissemination of news to the public at large.96
It is important to emphasize that quasi-patents will allow noncom-
petitors far more expansive use privileges than the “experimental use”
exception currently provides.  This exception was born out of the judicial
93. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
94. Id. at 229–31.
95. Id. at 236 (introducing concept of quasi-property with respect to news).
96. Id. at 235 (recognizing “the added profit so necessary as an incentive” to
encourage commercial news gathering).
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interpretation of the concept of infringement in the Patent Act.97  It was
meant to permit limited noncommercial uses of patented inventions.98
Over time, though, the courts restricted the applicability of the exception
so much that it can no longer be treated as a meaningful policy tool.  As
Katherine Strandburg explained, “the experimental-use exemption has
been reduced to a mere de minimis exception that bears little relation to
the implications of a particular experimental use for the public benefits
of follow-on innovation.”99  Quasi-patent protection, by contrast, will give
the public and, more importantly, other inventors significantly more
breathing room.  It will permit not only study and experimentation, but
also improvements on the underlying invention.  Thus quasi-patents have
the potential to bring about considerable follow-on innovation.
Allowing noncompetitors to patent follow-on innovation raises the
concern that such improvement patents could conceivably be used later
on to exclude the original quasi-patent holder.  This, in turn, may under-
mine the entire quasi-patent model.  This concern, however, can be ad-
dressed by requiring all noncompetitors to freely license any new related
patents (e.g., continuations, divisionals) to all downstream users.100  Fur-
thermore, in order to increase the number of quasi-patents and turn this
option into an attractive default, it is possible to legally stipulate that all
improvements of quasi-patents must be protected by quasi-patents them-
selves.101  Adoption of this requirement could lead to the creation of net-
97. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of Patent
Infringement, 39 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 357, 363–64 (1957) (discussing historical evolution of
experimental use exception).
98. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:  Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017, 1034–36 (1989) (discussing historical
development of distinction between commercial and noncommercial uses).  The timing of
the disclosure of patents suggests that patent holders’ rights are not absolute, even during
a patent term.  See id. at 1022 (“If the public had absolutely no right to use the disclosure
without the patent holder’s consent until after the patent expired, it would make little
sense to require that the disclosure be made freely available to the public at the outset of
the patent term.”).
99. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?  Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 81, 87; see also Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351,
1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“On remand, the district court will have to significantly narrow
and limit its conception of the experimental use defense.”); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g
Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (refusing to apply experimental use exception
to tests performed “expressly for commercial purposes”).
100. A similar “viral licensing” mechanism is used in the GNU General Public
License—likely the most popular free software license in use today.  See Free Software
Found., GNU General Public License § 10 (version 3) (June 29, 2007) [hereinafter GNU
General Public License], available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
101. The nonprofit corporation, Creative Commons, has developed a public
copyright license, now in wide use, that enforces a similar “share alike” scheme.  For
Creative Commons’ “human-readable summary” of the license, see Creative Commons,
Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported, available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-sa/3.0/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 21, 2011) (“If you alter,
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works of quasi-patents under certain circumstances.102  Moreover, this
feature could enhance inventors’ motivations to opt for quasi-patent pro-
tection in the first place; they would know their selection would contrib-
ute to the future proliferation of quasi-patents.
We are aware of the fact that the introduction of quasi-patents as an
opt-in regime is not without a cost.  The inclusion of quasi-patents in the
menu of legal options would necessitate courts to determine which de-
fendants are competitors of the quasi-patent holders.  In most cases, this
determination will be straightforward.  In some cases, however, it will be
more complex.103  The challenge is not insurmountable, however, and
the difficulty involved in distinguishing between competitors and non-
competitors should not be exaggerated.  In addressing this task, courts
could aid themselves by turning to the definitions developed in antitrust
law.  The definitions developed to define product and service markets for
antitrust purposes could be readily applied to disputes involving quasi-
patents.104  It should also be remembered that although the judicial cost
of resolving quasi-patent cases may be slightly higher than the cost of de-
ciding patent cases, the overall number of cases will be lower, owing to the
fact that quasi-patents restrict the group of potential defendants.  Conse-
transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under the
same or similar license to this one.”).
102. The “viral” potential for quasi-patents may be limited, however, if downstream
users of improvements are competitors of the original inventor.  For example, assume a
market with three actors:  Alpha, Beta, and Gamma.  Assume that Alpha and Beta are not
competitors, while Alpha and Gamma are competitors.  If Alpha obtains a quasi-patent on
an invention, then in this scenario, Beta may use the invention freely, while Gamma must
pay a royalty.  However, a problem may arise if Beta and Gamma are not mutual
competitors:  If Beta were to devise an improvement on Alpha’s invention, then under a
“viral” quasi-patent scheme, Gamma, as a noncompetitor of Beta, might automatically have
royalty-free use of that improvement.  This result may be undesirable to Alpha, and could
discourage adoption of the quasi-patent form.  One solution to this problem would be for
networks of quasi-patents to always exclude downstream competitors of upstream
inventors.
103. Indeed, this was one of the concerns raised by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in
INS v. AP.  Among other things, Justice Brandeis argued that the practical administration
of a quasi-property system would be far more nuanced and complex than the majority
seemed to appreciate.  Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 262–63 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).  For discussion of the majority opinion, see supra notes 93–96 R
and accompanying text.
104. Antitrust experts have developed sophisticated methods to define competitive
and noncompetitive markets and firms across a variety of industries.  See Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors 16 (Apr. 2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing identification and assessment of competitive effects in
product and geographic markets).  A variety of factors may be relevant to identifying
competitors, including consumers’ willingness to purchase substitute products.  See U.S.
Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
5–15 (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/03/Commentaryonthe
HorizontalMergerGuidelinesMarch2006.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing mechanics of defining competitive markets).
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quently, quasi-patents may lower the total cost of dispute resolution, even
though the average cost per case will be somewhat higher.
C. Semi-Patents
A second opt-in regime we wish to introduce may be termed a semi-
patent.  The underlying design is predicated on the idea that lawmakers
can expand or contract property rights by adjusting the rules that govern
the initial acquisition of the relevant right.105  Specifically, lawmakers can
make it easy or difficult to acquire rights in different assets by setting lax
or strict prerequisites for securing protection.  Indeed, differential acqui-
sition rules pervade our intellectual property law.  Copyright poses the
lowest barrier of all—protection springs into existence when original ex-
pression is fixed in a tangible medium of expression.106  Trademark law
sets the bar a little higher by conditioning protection on the use of a
mark in commerce.107  Finally, patent law goes even further by condition-
ing protection on the substantive requirements of novelty,108 useful-
ness,109 and nonobviousness.110
To arrive at the concept of a semi-patent, we add one more precon-
dition:  disclosure of all research results—both positive and negative—
that led to the claimed invention.  Suppression of relevant information
would be punishable by loss of protection.  Accordingly, if at any point
during the review process or after the issuance of the patent, it can be
proven that a semi-patent applicant withheld information from the
USPTO, she will lose her protection immediately and retroactively.  Un-
like quasi-patents, semi-patents offer the same panoply of rights and pow-
ers as regular patents, and moreover, they protect these rights against the
rest of the world.  What differentiates semi-patents from both quasi-pat-
ents and regular patents is the prerequisite of full information disclosure.
But why focus on information sharing?  It is widely agreed that infor-
mation sharing can dramatically reduce the cost and improve the rate of
innovation in our society.111  Indeed, in recent years, there have been
several interesting attempts to induce better information sharing.112  Su-
105. Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1505, 1509–16
(2009) (discussing acquisition of copyright and patent rights).
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (providing copyright eligibility for any original
work of authorship “fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”).
107. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological
Age 635 (rev. 4th ed. 2007) (“Rather, trademark protection is awarded merely to those who
were the first to use a distinctive mark in commerce.”).
108. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
110. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
111. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of data sharing). R
112. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Timing is Everything:  Latency Analysis and the
Design of the Genomic Commons 16–20 (Feb. 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
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perior access to research information can alleviate the problem of dupli-
cative research efforts, and moreover, can help point subsequent re-
searchers in the right direction.  This is true not only for positive research
results, but also for negative ones.  Information about failed research at-
tempts can be just as valuable to fellow researchers as the details of suc-
cesses.  Sharing postmortems of failed experiments can help others avoid
potential pitfalls and point them in the right direction.113  It should be
borne in mind that information about failed research in a particular in-
dustry may be useful to inventors in other industries as well.
At present, however, there is no incentive to offer broad disclosure.
On the contrary, there is a strong incentive to disclose as little as possible
and thereby let competitors squander valuable resources.  This strategy is
known in the economic literature as “raising rivals’ costs.”114  In light of
the natural tendency of inventors to suppress information, one might
have expected the Patent Act to incorporate a broad disclosure require-
ment.  Yet, no such broad requirement exists.  The Patent Act imposes a
very modest enablement requirement according to which the written
specification must “enable any person skilled in the art to which it per-
tains . . . to make and use the same,” and must include the inventor’s best
mode of doing so.115  Semi-patents represent an opt-in form that man-
available at http://works.bepress.com/Jorge_contreras/1/ (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing temporal aspects of data release policies in collaborative genetic
research initiatives and explaining primacy of timing and “latency analysis” in various
informational commons); see also U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Final NIH
Statement on Sharing Research Data (2003), available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/
guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-03-032.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[D]ata
sharing is essential for expedited translation of research results into knowledge, products
and procedures to improve human health.”); Eric Campbell & David Blumenthal, The
Selfish Gene:  Data Sharing and Withholding in Academic Genetics, Science Careers, May
31, 2002, at http://sciencecareers.sciencemag.org/career_magazine/previous_issues/
articles/2002_05_31/noDOI.5822398718525511595 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(advocating expanded data sharing policies in field of genetics and enumerating ways in
which data sharing benefits science—namely, by preventing needless duplicative efforts,
enabling peers to fully review and test claims, and providing future generations of scientists
with the tools they need); Steve Lohr, Bringing Data Mining into the Mainstream, N.Y.
Times Bits Blog, July 26, 2010, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/bringing-data-
mining-into-the-mainstream [hereinafter Lohr, Data Mining] (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (discussing growing importance of data availability and analysis in
corporations).
113. See, e.g., William J. Broad, Taking Lessons From What Went Wrong, N.Y. Times,
July 20, 2010, at D1 (“Disaster, in short, can become a spur to innovation.”).
114. Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 Am. Econ. Rev.
(Special Issue) 267, 267 (1983).
115. 35 U.S.C. § 112; In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining
specification “must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the
claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation’”); see also Scripps Clinic Research
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1578–80 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (revealing limitation
of best mode requirement by finding no best mode violation where antibodies used by
inventors of patents in suit were different from those obtainable by following process set
forth in specification).  But see Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, 566 F.3d 1282, 1291–95 (Fed. Cir.
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dates much broader disclosure.  It would force applicants to expose the
entire body of research that culminated in the invention.
As to the disclosure date, we propose that the relevant data be re-
leased to the public immediately after the approval of the application.
Making disclosure conditional on the issuance of the patent would strike
the right balance between the interest of the applicants, on the one hand,
and the interest of the public, on the other.  Requiring applicants to dis-
close before the approval date might constitute a serious disincentive to
select this mode of protection.  Inventors might fear that if, at the end of
the day, the application is not approved, they would have to divulge valua-
ble knowledge without getting anything in return.  And while it is true
that, from the vantage point of the public, the sooner disclosure occurs,
the better, since we are dealing with an opt-in regime, we must provide
applicants with sufficient incentives to select it.
The addition of semi-patents to the list of intellectual property forms
will give rise to two related concerns.  The first is that of selective disclo-
sure—or, more accurately, nondisclosure.  Inventors who select this form
of protection may conceal crucial findings from the public or even distort
certain results in order to harm competitors.116  This problem arises
under all disclosure regimes and it is impossible to root it out entirely.117
Typically, the law employs penalties to deter selective disclosure.118
In our case, the proposed penalty is loss of protection.  It should be
noted that a similar penalty is employed under current patent law against
patent applicants who make false representations to the USPTO.119  It is
also used in cases of patent misuse.120  From a theoretical standpoint, the
penalty should be tailored to the probability of detection.  If applicants
believe that there is a very low probability that selective disclosure will be
2009) (limiting scope of product-by-process claims and thus potentially encouraging, but
not mandating, broader disclosure with respect to some claim types).
116. We use “selective disclosure” as an umbrella term to describe the many ways that
a patent applicant could conceal helpful results (e.g., hiding valuable results amidst
thousands of pages of useless data, distorting the importance of certain results).  We also
acknowledge that useful results may take different forms depending on the nature of the
underlying research.  For example, genetic research data may be written in a laboratory
notebook, while research data in the field of software may exist in the form of log files,
crash reports, or usability test results.  As the semi-patent model develops, so too might a
body of industry-specific disclosure standards.
117. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets,
and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1229, 1236, 1268–73 (2001)
(discussing prohibition of selective disclosure in context of insider trading).
118. See, e.g., id. (discussing legal sanctions in context of insider trading).
119. See Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent
Litigation, 7 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 37, 52–53 (1993) (discussing use of 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1952)
as vehicle for infringement defense when applicant engaged in “inequitable conduct,”
including fraudulent misrepresentations to USPTO).
120. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev.
1575, 1662 (2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers] (“Under a long-standing
common law doctrine, patents are unenforceable if they have been misused by their
owner.”).
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detected, they may choose to conceal information notwithstanding the
risk of losing their intellectual property rights.121  In this case, it may be
necessary to augment the basic sanction of loss of protection with mone-
tary penalties.  However, the likelihood of detection may not be as low as
it may seem at first blush.  Other researchers who are skilled in the rele-
vant field of invention may infer that the data shared with the public is
incomplete or inaccurate.  The same way a careful peer review may un-
cover errors in scientific publications, thorough analysis of the research
records can reveal holes and inconsistencies.122  In addition, attempts at
concealment may be inferred from academic publications and other doc-
uments of the inventing firm.123
The second concern relates to the judicial cost of enforcing the pro-
posed disclosure regime.  If recognition of quasi-patents would require
courts to determine who is a competitor and who is not, the introduction
of semi-patents would require courts to face the challenge of deciding
which research data is related to the claimed invention and which is not.
Inventors who suppress data would invariably claim that the unpublished
data is not part of the body of research that led to the semi-patent.  All
challenged inventors would raise this claim—whether it is true or not—
and a pooling equilibrium would result.  In this case, we cannot offer
courts any shortcuts.  Tribunals would have to carefully examine the data
and seek assistance from scientific experts in deciding what data relates to
what project.  If the inventor had a single research project, courts could
look at the date of the disputed research data and easily resolve the prob-
lem.  If, on the other hand, the inventor had multiple simultaneous
projects, the court’s task would be considerably more complex.  It is diffi-
cult to predict in the abstract how prevalent such disputes would be.  It
appears fairly certain, though, that some conflicts will arise and courts
will have to deal with them.
121. This statement finds support in the classic work of Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169, 176 (1968) (emphasizing
deterrence value of certainty of punishment).
122. The ability of expert communities to detect inaccurate or biased information
and to effectively self-police is well documented.  For example, Wikipedia, the online
encyclopedia, relies on devoted volunteers guided by community norms to produce
accurate written content and to detect undesired conduct.  See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain,
The Future of the Internet—And How to Stop It 127–48 (2008) (describing success of
Wikipedia’s self-governed community).  Similarly, there are notable examples of experts
successfully detecting and reporting flawed scientific research in scientific communities.
See, e.g., Brian Vastag, Cancer Fraud Case Stuns Research Community, Prompts Reflection
on Peer Review Process, 98 J. Nat’l Cancer Inst. 374, 375 (2006) (describing how
fabrications in widely published cancer study were detected and reported by doctor
familiar with the subject matter).  Similarly, accurate disclosure in the semi-patent context
may be meaningfully encouraged through professional norms and an atmosphere of civic
duty.
123. Granted, often there are no such publications in the case of individual inventors,
but individual inventors may not be as adept as firms at concealing information or
tampering with data.
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It bears emphasis, however, that even if some information will be
suppressed from competitors—a scenario we readily recognize—the in-
troduction of semi-patents would lead to considerably more disclosure
than exists under traditional patent protection.  In the final tally, the ad-
dition of semi-patents to the menu of intellectual property forms would
dramatically improve our understanding of inventive processes—an im-
provement that would likely be translated into more innovation.  And
while the disclosure the public receives might not always be complete, it
would still be a marked improvement over the current enablement
requirement.
III. INCORPORATING QUASI-PATENTS AND SEMI-PATENTS INTO
COMMUNITIES OF INNOVATION
In this Part, we explain how semi-patents and quasi-patents can ini-
tially be introduced within technology cooperatives, which we term “com-
munities of innovation.”  Such a “pilot” stage would serve to substantiate
quasi- and semi-patents for interested stakeholders and, in the process,
benefit important research and development efforts.  The discussion that
follows demonstrates why communities of innovation are ideal platforms
for the introduction and refinement of our semi-/quasi-patent proposal.
A. Background
Although semi-patents and quasi-patents are functionally dissimilar,
both capitalize on the fact that innovation is often a cumulative process.
Quasi-patents allow noncompetitors to build on existing inventions; semi-
patents aggregate know-how by requiring research data sharing.  Thus,
both forms of protection inherently contemplate multiple actors working
toward common goals.  This is not a central feature of extant proposals to
alter patent rights, such as varying the time span of protection,124 or cre-
ating a technology-specific patent system.125  Importantly, this “social”
characteristic makes semi-patents and quasi-patents particularly well
suited to certain types of technology-sharing collectives.
The sharing of technological know-how within some industries dates
back centuries.  An early example can be found in the mineral mines of
Cornwall, England during the late 1700s.  At the time, underground
124. See NRC, 21st Century, supra note 8, at 44 n.11 (noting “a contemporary R
proposal to limit the term of business method patents to three or five years” attracted
attention of some policymakers).  For prior examples of patent term extensions, see 35
U.S.C. § 155A (2000) (extending term of protection for some types of patents); Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b–68c, 70b (1994), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note,
355, 360cc (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (1994)) (permitting
term extensions on new drugs of up to five years under some circumstances).
125. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 120, at 1630–33 (providing R
examples of various proposals to “legislate different patent standards for different
industries”).
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flooding frequently interfered with mining operations, costing mine own-
ers considerable time and money.126  The problem was so serious that
many mines hired outside engineers that specialized in designing water
pumps.  Although a good pump design could have given any single mine
a competitive advantage, a group of “mine captains” established a
monthly trade journal for the purpose of publicizing pump designs.127
This journal, which was called Lean’s Engine Reporter, not only contained
detailed designs, but also valuable data describing pump performance
and efficiency.128  Historians believe that this early example of invention
sharing was motivated by two forces:  First, many mine operators held
interests (both financial and strategic) in the aggregate performance of
all of the mines;129 second, the science of fluid dynamics during this pe-
riod was not well understood.130  As a result, innovative pump designs
were often the product of trial and error, rather than the direct applica-
tion of scientific theory.131  The mine owners of Cornwall allowed pump
designs to be publicized because doing so lessened the total amount of
trial and error needed to advance the industry as a whole.132  Through
this limited form of cooperation, business adversaries placed long-term
gains over immediate payoffs.
Over one hundred years later, during the fierce trials of the First
World War, a similar community of innovation formed in the United
States.  Airplanes, still a new technology at the time, offered important
new strategic advantages over traditional modes of combat.  To prevail,
the U.S. government needed to quickly assemble a large fleet of aircrafts.
However, because many individual firms held the patents covering air-
craft technology, there was a risk that precious time would be lost while a
multitude of individual licenses were negotiated.133  A novel plan solved
this problem:  Through a special corporation called the Manufacturer’s
Aircraft Association (MAA), all necessary patents were pooled and collec-
126. Alessandro Nuvolari, Collective Invention During the British Industrial
Revolution:  The Case of the Cornish Pumping Engine, 28 Cambridge J. Econ. 347, 352–53
(2004).
127. Id. at 354.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 356 (discussing unique characteristics of “cost book system,” a mode of
industrial organization present in Cornish mining economy during this period).
130. Id. (discussing fact that scientific understanding at the time lagged behind state
of technology).
131. Id. (“Thus, the design of the Cornish engine always remained in what we might
call a fluid state, and this probably facilitated a more thorough exploration of the space of
technological opportunities, avoiding the risk of remaining trapped in a local optimum
configuration.”).
132. Id. (“By pooling all the accumulated experience, it was possible to focus the
search process on the most promising directions.”).
133. Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment,
95 Cornell L. Rev. 657, 660–61 & n.5 (2010) (citing Harry T. Dykman, Patent Licensing
Within the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association (MAA), 46 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 646, 648–50
(1964)); see also Shapiro, supra note 50, at 127–28 (discussing MAA). R
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tively licensed—largely on royalty-free terms.134  As with the miners of
Cornwall, a common goal took precedence over individual competitive
interests.  Ultimately, this instance of patent sharing contributed to
America’s victory in the conflict.
In the past ten years, similar types of patent sharing and knowledge
sharing initiatives have appeared in a variety of contexts.  For example,
leading computer software makers have begun collaborating to openly
license patents within closed pools, as well as to the public at large.  Do-
nors to such open licensing initiatives include industry giants like HP,
IBM, Ericsson, Nokia, Novell, Red Hat, Oracle, Philips, and Sony.135  Be-
yond the software industry, other organizations have begun collecting
and licensing patents that benefit the environment and disadvantaged
communities.  Participants in these efforts include the likes of Xerox,
IBM, Sony, Yahoo, and Nike.  Yet another field that has spawned the shar-
ing of patents and data is genetics.  Today, biobanks—shared collections
of tissue samples and associated data—play an important role in the
ongoing quest to cure human illnesses.
Although contemporary technological collectives have arisen in
vastly different contexts, they all share important similarities:  Each pri-
vately reorders default intellectual property rights vis-a`-vis licenses; each
has rules of conduct that members must obey; each is organized around
neutral principles—that is to say, each community strives to balance the
rights of patent donors against those of patent users.  As we noted at the
outset, we refer to such organizations as “communities of innovation.”
The examples above reveal an important point:  Communities of in-
novation are not limited to patent pools.  While patent pools like the
MAA serve to reduce licensing transaction costs that would otherwise im-
pede the development of a specific technology,136 communities of inno-
vation capture a broader set of cooperative activities—for example, the
collective sharing of patents and know-how in order to broadly encourage
research and experimentation within certain industries.
The basic institutional structure described above makes communities
of innovation ideally suited for quasi- and semi-patents.  For example, the
license agreements that legally bind communities of innovation can easily
be adapted to incorporate quasi- and semi-patent rights.  As Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith cogently demonstrated, an important difference
between private contracts and traditional in rem property rights is the
ability of contracts to be highly customized.137  Unbound by precedent or
134. Madison, supra note 133, at 660–61. R
135. The examples mentioned briefly in this paragraph are discussed in greater detail
later in this Part.
136. See generally Shapiro, supra note 50, at 121–22, 127–29, 134–42 (discussing R
economic basis for cross-licensing and patent pools, with particular focus on standards-
setting).  The MAA is a prime historical example of a patent pool, and modern-day analogs
are abundant—particularly in the realm of standards-setting collectives.
137. Merrill & Smith, supra note 77, at 3. R
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politics, the private contracts used by communities of innovation can be
finely tuned to optimize the semi-patent and quasi-patent forms during
the initial pilot phase of our proposal.
In another aspect, communities of innovation can serve to insulate
semi-patents and quasi-patents from external market forces, thus facilitat-
ing careful evaluation of these new property forms.  Just as scientists can
more easily observe natural phenomena that are isolated from outside
disruptions, policymakers could more easily measure the success of quasi-
and semi-patents that are sheltered within closed communities.138
Beyond these advantages, we believe that quasi- and semi-patents can
confer real, measurable benefits on communities of innovation that will
help pave the way to widespread adoption of these new property forms.
And, because many such collectives are still in early stages of develop-
ment, we believe our suggestions stand a good chance of being adopted.
In the remainder of this Part, we discuss how the goals of communities of
innovation would be well served by quasi- and semi-patents.
B. Genetics
Today, genetic researchers across the globe are working to develop
new preventions, diagnoses, and cures for deadly diseases.  Increasingly,
the research driving this ambitious work relies on biobanks—repositories
of shared biological materials and associated data.  These facilities allow
researchers to draw insights from massive amounts of raw genomic infor-
mation.  Many such facilities are in operation at universities, hospitals,
private corporations, and nonprofit entities worldwide.139
Biobank policymakers continue to face vexing questions in their
ongoing quest to serve researchers:  How can patents incentivize, and not
frustrate research?  To the extent that data sharing among researchers is
helpful, to what degree should biobanks mandate it?  Many biobanks in
operation today have experimented with a variety of measures designed
to balance these tensions, but there have been no widely adopted solu-
tions with respect to patents and data sharing.140  Rulemaking remains in
flux.
Quasi-patents and semi-patents provide new solutions to these chal-
lenging problems.  Quasi-patents have the ability to balance two compet-
ing forces that lie at the heart of biobanking:  the frequent need for re-
138. See, e.g., Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation:
Evidence from the Human Genome 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 16213, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16213 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (demonstrating case in which closed IP regime facilitated careful
study in genomics context).
139. For an informative overview of the intellectual property issues that pertain to
biobanks, see generally Brenda M. Simon, How to Get a Fair Share:  IP Policies for Publicly
Supported Biobanks, 1 Stan. J.L. Sci. & Pol’y 65 (2009).
140. See generally Christopher Heaney et al., The Perils of Taking Property Too Far,
1 Stan. J.L. Sci. & Pol’y 46 (2009) (exploring various approaches to biobank governance).
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searchers to practice patented processes, and the importance of
commercial incentives that fuel further research.141  Simply put, research-
ers will not sow unless they stand to reap.  By permitting only noncom-
petitors to use genetic patents on a royalty-free basis, the quasi-patent
form would allow basic research to advance unfettered while preserving
commercial incentives that draw investments of time, capital, and
expertise.142
Semi-patents present equally compelling possibilities for genomic
collectives.  Like geographic maps revealing the location of buried trea-
sure, genome maps include valuable information (e.g., raw research data
and findings), as well as specific applications of that information in the
form of patents.  And, just as the utility of a treasure map as a navigational
guide can be divorced from its use to locate and extract hidden riches, so
too can the information produced in the course of genetic research be
separated from the commercial application of that information defined
by patents.  Semi-patents facilitate this beneficial division of genetic as-
sets.143  Ultimately, this would be a boon for biobanks.  As the director of
the NIH and former director of the Human Genome Project wrote in a
recent Nature article, “free and open access to genome data has had a
profoundly positive effect on [the] progress” of genetic research.144
Viewed from another angle, semi-patents encourage communal ben-
efit sharing that has long existed in other areas of property law.  For ex-
ample, the Rule of Prior Appropriation in water rights—sometimes called
the “Colorado Rule”—grants senior rights to the first owner who uses a
source of water for beneficial purposes, such as farming or municipal
use.145  In a semi-patent regime, genetic researchers would be free to as-
sert their patents against any infringer, but their right to exclude would
be contingent on cooperation with a mandatory data-sharing policy.  Fail-
ure to share relevant data would result in invalidity of a member’s patent
rights—in effect, making data sharing a requirement of semi-patent valid-
ity.  Thus, like the Rule of Prior Appropriation, semi-patents only confer
patent ownership upon those who put research data to good use through
sharing.
141. See Simon, supra note 139, at 67 (discussing need to balance “transparency and R
non-monetary benefit[s]” at biobanks “against potential diminished incentives for research
and development”).
142. Moreover, a standard licensing rate could be included in privately ordered quasi-
patent arrangements to avoid transaction costs that might otherwise arise from license
negotiations.
143. For a deeper discussion of the division of property assets, see generally Bell &
Parchomovsky, Property in Three Dimensions, supra note 84. R
144. Francis Collins, Has the Revolution Arrived?, 464 Nature 674, 675 (2010).
145. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882) (establishing
Colorado Rule, also known as Colorado doctrine of first appropriation); see also David B.
Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism:  Distributive Justice in the Creation of Property
Rights, 32 Ecology L.Q. 3, 64 (2005) (discussing Colorado Rule).
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In sum, quasi-patents, which can only be enforced against one’s com-
petitors, respect the importance of basic research.  Semi-patents, which
are conditioned on compliance with a data-sharing policy, attempt to
place patents and data sharing in complementary roles.  Together, these
new forms of intellectual property protection may have the power to in-
crease knowledge sharing and research in biobanking communities.
C. Software
Semi-patents and quasi-patents can also benefit software patent col-
lectives.  The roots of community-based software patent licensing stretch
back to when the open source movement was founded in the 1980s.  At
that time, the introduction of affordable home computers to the con-
sumer market inspired a generation of hobbyists to explore the art and
utility of writing software.146  However, the risk of liability for copyright
infringement discouraged many hobbyists from working together to de-
velop programs of substantial depth or complexity.147
It was in this environment that the open source movement was born.
Part method and part philosophy, the movement sought to reduce licens-
ing transaction costs and the threat of copyright infringement vis-a`-vis
public copyright licenses that attached to original computer code as well
as any derivative works.148  During the late 1980s and 1990s, open source
took root with a large number of programmers.  Using special licenses
and the Internet as a collaboration and distribution medium, open
source communities produced software on which businesses and consum-
ers have since come to depend, such as the Linux operating system, the
Firefox web browser, and the Apache web server.
But during the past ten years, the stakes and the players have
changed.  After the Federal Circuit established the patentability of
software methods in the late 1990s, there was a steep rise in the level of
software patenting.149  The growing importance of software patents was a
clear matter of concern to open source advocates:  Most of the public
licenses that open source projects were founded upon contemplated cop-
yright infringement, but did not address the issue of software patents.150
146. See, e.g., Zittrain, supra note 122, at 14–15 (discussing development of computer R
programming as hobby during 1980s).
147. See Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs:  The Rise of Intellectual
Property and How it Threatens Creativity 154 (2001) (discussing Richard Stallman’s belief
that copyright “impeded the development of the best possible software”).
148. See GNU General Public License, supra note 100, pmbl. (creating “a free, R
copyleft license for software and other kinds of works”).
149. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (discussing recent increased levels R
of patenting).
150. See, e.g., Free Software Found., GNU General Public License (version 1) (Feb.
1989), available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-1.0.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (lacking reference to patents).  In part, the designers of open source licenses
may have been slow to include patent terms because the licensing of patents differs greatly
from the licensing of copyrighted works.  For example, defining the scope of patents
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Not surprisingly, the issue also did not escape the attention of com-
petitors.  In the early 2000s, several leading software vendors contacted
open source projects expressing the view that their patents were being
infringed.151  Open source advocates took these expressions of concern
seriously:  Damages for patent infringement could be high, courts gener-
ally seemed to favor patentees, and at least some of the patent infringe-
ment concerns expressed seemed to have legal merit.152  The future via-
bility of open source became an open question.
Motivated by these concerns, stakeholders in the open source move-
ment have recently assembled defensive software patent sharing collec-
tives.  An example often cited in the press is the Open Invention Network
(OIN)—a corporation that gathers software patents and licenses them at
no cost to participants.153  While the OIN bears some similarity to the
Manufacturer’s Aircraft Alliance, discussed earlier, its goals are primarily
defensive.154  As the group’s website explains, “Patents owned by Open
Invention Network are available royalty-free to any company, institution
or individual that agrees not to assert its patents against the Linux
System.”155  The company, which was founded in 2005, has the backing of
leading stakeholders in open source projects, including I.B.M., Novell,
Philips, Red Hat, and Sony.156
The quasi-patent model presents new possibilities for organizations
like OIN.  Currently, the group licenses its patents only to entities that
promise not to assert their patents against the Linux platform.  While this
policy is focused on defending the Linux operating system, it does not
take into account potentially undesirable behavior between the members
of the collective itself.  For example, under the model used by OIN, a
firm’s patents could be used by a competing member of the network to
erode the patent-holding firm’s market share.  The quasi-patent model
necessary to practice a particular embodiment of an invention may require careful
investigation and legal analysis.  Likewise, useful patent licensing can require sharing of
related know-how.
151. See, e.g., Laurie J. Flynn, New Economy:  A Unix Company Hopes a Microsoft
Deal Will Strengthen Its Legal Case Against Linux, N.Y. Times, May 26, 2003, at C3
(discussing legal controversy involving Utah-based firm called SCO, which at one time
owned key patents to Unix operating system and believed these patents were infringed by
Linux).  Follow-up accounts of this dispute include Barnaby J. Feder, I.B.M. Files
Countersuits in a Dispute Over Linux Licensing, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2003, at C4
(describing Microsoft counterattack against SCO); Steve Lohr, No Concession from I.B.M.
in Linux Fight, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2003, at C1 (describing Microsoft’s refusal to settle).
152. See sources cited supra note 151; see also supra Part I.A (discussing patentee- R
friendly attitudes in Federal Circuit).
153. See Open Invention Network, at http://www.openinventionnetwork.com (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 21, 2011) (“Open Invention Network
is an intellectual property company that was formed to promote the Linux system by using
patents to create a collaborative ecosystem.”).
154. See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (discussing MAA). R
155. Open Invention Network, About OIN, at http://www.openinventionnetwork.
com/about.php (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
156. Id.
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cures this risk by forbidding the unlicensed use of patents between com-
petitors.  By eliminating the risk of having patents used against their own-
ers’ commercial interests, the quasi-patent model could encourage
greater participation in open software collectives.
We are cognizant of the often subtle and dynamic nature of competi-
tion.  Indeed, scholars in the field of behavioral economics have devoted
deep study to the myriad ways that firms can simultaneously compete and
cooperate.157  In the context of introducing quasi-patents to open
software collectives, this fact presents definitional challenges, but ones
that can be overcome.  For example, it may be desirable in some applica-
tions of the quasi-patent principle to limit the definition of “competitor”
to only specific markets.  Here, the quasi-patent form would allow two
large firms to treat one another as “competitors” with respect to certain
families of quasi-patents, and “noncompetitors” with respect to others.  As
discussed earlier, fine tuning of this sort is quite possible through the
private license agreements that bind communities of innovation.
The semi-patent form can also benefit software communities.  At first
blush, writing code may not seem like a research-driven activity.  Unlike
genetic science, which is focused on studying the natural world, software
development is aimed entirely toward building a functioning product.  As
the famous software engineer, Frederick P. Brooks, eloquently said,
“Scientists build to learn; Engineers learn to build.”158
Although the goals and methods of software developers and research
scientists differ, both fields often rely heavily on trial and error.  Indeed,
“debugging” software, one of the most costly aspects of software engineer-
ing, is often a brute force, hit-and-miss process.159  As a result, the genera-
tion and study of performance data is often critical.  Surprisingly though,
the industry has traditionally viewed such testing data as a byproduct of
little value—the detritus of creation.160  But recently, software developers
have begun appreciating the fact that raw data can be a valuable asset.161
For instance, some programmers have begun collecting and sharing data
describing the performance of third-party tools.162  Likewise, others have
157. See, e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation:  Agent-Based Models
of Competition and Collaboration 3–8 (1997).
158. Daniel Page, A Practical Introduction to Computer Architecture 43 (David Gries
& Fred B. Schneider eds., 2009) (quoting Frederick P. Brooks).
159. Janusz Laski & William Stanley, Software Verification and Analysis:  An
Integrated, Hands-On Approach 14 (2009).
160. See Lohr, Data Mining, supra note 112 (reporting that, in opinion of one expert, R
“data was [traditionally] regarded as a byproduct of doing business, often a backward-
looking record of little value”).
161. Id. (providing accounts of growing importance of data management).
162. See, e.g., Lenny Rachitsky, A Proposal for New Community Focused on Web
Performance, Transparent Uptime Blog (Apr. 30, 2010, 8:45 AM), http://www.transparent
uptime.com/2010/04/proposal-for-new-community-focused-on.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (proposing community based around sharing data on third-party
web services).  Notably, some web-based services have stepped in to provide up-to-the-
minute useful performance-related data to user communities.  See Amazon Web Services
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begun documenting “postmortem” accounts of failures, in order to help
others avoid similar missteps.163  These instances of research data sharing
appear to be valuable, but are not yet widespread.  Semi-patents could
add valuable new incentives for such data sharing within software com-
munities of innovation.  By making error reports and postmortems more
common, this new form of property protection could encourage a greater
spirit of collective endeavor and shed light on valuable information that
would otherwise be lost.
It bears mention that patent sharing has recently made inroads in a
closely related industry:  hardware.  Like software, hardware designs can
be protected by both copyright and patent law.164  Unlike intangible
software processes though, hardware designs are often more rooted in
the physical world, potentially making hardware an even more certain
and steady platform for patent sharing collectives.165  While still an unde-
veloped practice, hardware patent sharing marks another avenue in the
computer technology market where semi-patents and quasi-patents could
take hold.
As in the field of genetics, software communities of innovation can
benefit from the quasi- and semi-patent forms.  Quasi-patents can draw
software patent holders that are reluctant to share their property with
competitors; semi-patents have the potential to facilitate a valuable new
“data commons” in the software industry.  Together, these forms of pro-
tection can enhance and strengthen existing software patent sharing
initiatives.
D. The Environment and Public Health
The success of the open source movement has inspired new initia-
tives with goals that reach beyond the domain of computer software.
Some recent efforts are organized not around specific technologies, but
around broad goals, such as reducing industrial pollution and improving
the health of poor communities.  Here too, quasi-patents and semi-pat-
ents could play a beneficial role.
Service Health Dashboard, at http://status.aws.amazon.com/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2011)
(displaying real-time status of Amazon’s cloud computing services worldwide).
163. See, e.g., Mike Champion, Downtime Postmortem, Graysky Blog (Feb. 8, 2010),
http://graysky.org/2010/02/downtime-postmortem (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (documenting causes of service disruption at small startup web service).
164. See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–906 (2006)
(prescribing protection of “mask works”).
165. The degree of physicality or tangibility required of patentable subject matter has
long been a topic of debate.  The Federal Circuit’s 1998 State Street decision is often cited as
having significantly expanded the scope of business method and software patents eligible
for patentability.  State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998).  In the past year, highly publicized Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
decisions have drawn new attention to the issue.  See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010); see also supra note 32 (discussing Bilski and State Street). R
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Biological Innovation for an Open Society (BiOS) was launched by a
nonprofit organization called Cambia in early 2005.166  With the goal of
aiding disadvantaged communities around the world through technology
sharing, the organization developed and promoted a new open patent
license.  Since its inception, the group has facilitated the sharing of valua-
ble patents related to agriculture and medical care.167  In 2008 and 2009,
two similar patent-sharing initiatives appeared:  In 2008, The World
Business Council for Sustainable Development launched the Eco-Patent
Commons with the backing of I.B.M., Nokia, Pitney Bowes, and Sony.168
Drawing on this effort’s experiences, the legal nonprofit Creative
Commons, in collaboration with Nike and Best Buy, announced a project
called GreenXchange in early 2009.169  Both projects seek to aid the envi-
ronment by facilitating the licensing of a wide variety of technologies.
For instance, Nike contributed patents to GreenXchange that describe
new types of environmentally friendly rubber,170 and Yahoo contributed a
patent that reduces the energy consumption of data centers.171  The
Eco-Patent Commons has collected methods developed by Xerox for de-
contaminating groundwater, and methods developed by IBM for cleans-
ing semiconductor wafers.172
166. Biological Innovation for Open Society, at http://www.bios.net (last visited Jan.
21, 2011); see also The CAMBIA BiOS Initiative:  Implementation Phase, 2006–2008, at
2–9 (2006) [hereinafter BiOS], available at http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/bios/2029/
version/default/part/AttachmentData/data/BiOS%20Initiative%20Phase%202006-2008.
pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing development of BiOS project).
167. See BiOS, supra note 166, at 10–13 (describing BiOS initiative); BiOS Licensed R
Patents Inventory, Cambia.org, at http://www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/4285.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 21, 2011) (listing patents available
for nonexclusive use); see also BiOS-Compatible Agreement Listing, Cambia.org, at
http://www.cambia.org/daisy/bios/mta/agreement-patented.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 21, 2011) (describing benefits of BiOS-compatible
agreement).
168. See World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Eco-Patent Commons,
at http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?type=p&MenuId=
MTQ3NQ&doOpen=1&ClickMenu=LeftMenu (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Jan. 21, 2011); see also Mary Tripsas, Everybody in the Pool of Green Innovation,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2009, at N5 (discussing, inter alia, GreenXchange and Eco-Patent
Commons).
169. Press Release, Kaitlin Thaney, Creative Commons, GreenXchange—A Project of
Creative Commons, Nike and Best Buy (Feb. 10, 2009), at http://creativecommons.org/
weblog/entry/12734 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also The GreenXchange,
at http://greenxchange.force.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
170. See Search Results:  Rubber, GreenXchange.force.com, at http://greenxchange.
force.com/vGXSearch?keywords=rubber (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Jan. 21, 2011) (listing rubber patents Nike has contributed to GreenXchange).
171. See Search Results:  Energy Efficiency, GreenXchange.force.com, at
http://greenxchange.force.com/vGXSearch?keywords=energyefficiency (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 21, 2011) (listing patents relating to energy
efficiency offered by Yahoo).
172. See Tripsas, supra note 168. R
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Gathering a wide range of technologies presents a wide variety of
challenges.  For example, while some inventions may not have great mar-
ket value—such as an I.B.M. patent for a recyclable cardboard insert that
cuts down on shipping costs173—many patents that would be valuable to
these collectives have great commercial value to their owners.  Indeed,
patents can often be a corporation’s crown jewels.  Convincing firms to
license such highly valued assets is not an easy task.  Creative Commons
prudently addressed this challenge by crafting an open patent license
that permits patent owners to collect royalty fees and impose field-of-use
limitations.174  Explaining the strength of this approach, Creative
Commons’ VP of Science, John Wilbanks, told the New York Times, “We
don’t depend on altruism.”175
Quasi-patents reflect a similar pragmatism.  By allowing patent hold-
ers to charge their rivals licensing fees while ensuring that noncompeti-
tors pay nothing, the quasi-patent form could encourage participation in
communities of innovation.  While the GreenXchange license allows
competing uses to be defined through field-of-use restrictions, the defini-
tion of “competitors” in our proposal is decided by the neutral adminis-
ters of the community itself.  In this way, quasi-patents are finely tuned to
the economic motivations of patentees.
As in the fields of genetics and software, environmental and public
health collectives can also benefit from the sharing of research data that
semi-patents encourage.  In fact, the BiOS project literature explicitly dis-
cusses why sharing not only patents, but also non-patented data, can ben-
efit fields as diverse as animal breeding, crop husbandry, and resource
conservation.176  Thus, the semi-patent model would be a valuable addi-
tion to the menu of protections available in environmental and public
health patent collectives.
Unlike software or gene patent sharing collectives, initiatives like
BiOS, GreenXchange, and the Eco-Patent Commons are organized
around conceptual goals, rather than specific subject matter.  We believe
that the addition of semi-patents and quasi-patents would help to bind
these efforts and attract new and valuable partners.  These accomplish-
ments would not only help make the case for broader adoption of our
proposals, but could help mark the way forward for disadvantaged com-




176. BiOS, supra note 166, at 5, 29 (discussing importance of sharing know-how as R
well as “how-not-to”).
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IV. INCORPORATING QUASI-PATENTS AND SEMI-PATENTS INTO THE
PATENT SYSTEM
In this Part, we explain how quasi-patents and semi-patents should be
implemented outside of the context of communities of innovation.  The
implementation of our proposal would give rise to two principal chal-
lenges:  The first challenge would be to generate the goodwill necessary
to prompt Congress to adopt our proposal; the second challenge would
be to convince inventors to prefer quasi-patents and semi-patents over
traditional patent protection.  As should be clear to the reader, virtually
every legal reform involves similar challenges.  In the remainder of this
Part, we show that both hurdles may be cleared in our case with relative
ease.
A. Political Goodwill
No legal reform can pass unless it is supported by the interest groups
that influence the legislative (or regulatory) process.  Furthermore, it is
easier to block legislation than to pass legislation.  Consequently, pro-
posed reforms that can benefit the public may often falter on account of
opposition by a powerful interest group.  We are fully cognizant of these
political realities.  Yet, we believe that our proposal can generate the nec-
essary political goodwill to become law.  Our guarded optimism is based
on the fact that our proposal neither threatens nor unduly burdens any
of the interest groups that shape patent law and policy.  It is relatively
modest in its scope and effect and may be perceived as benign and desira-
ble by all the groups that shape patent policy, per the following analysis.
The two principal groups that influence patent law and policy are
inventors and the USPTO.  The third relevant actor in the patent arena is
the public at large.177  The influence of the public on patent policy, how-
ever, is much more limited than that of either of the first two groups we
mentioned.  Nevertheless, we will also address the interest of the public.
Let us begin, though, by analyzing the likely reaction of inventors and the
USPTO to our proposal.  Neither inventors nor the USPTO have a strong
reason—or even a weak one—to oppose the introduction of quasi-
patents and semi-patents.  The formalization of these intellectual prop-
erty forms and their incorporation into an opt-in menu will increase in-
ventors’ choices without creating real cost for them.  If our proposal is
adopted, inventors will have a choice among three protection regimes.
The choice among the three options would be very straightforward and
would not require inventors to invest any real or cognitive resources.
Since quasi-patents and semi-patents would be added as opt-in regimes,
they would not erode the status of traditional patents.  Inventors would
177. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 Geo. L.J. 435, 467 n.138
(2004) (noting power and success of small inventor lobby in altering patent legislation to
suit its goals).  For a discussion of the influence of the USPTO on patent policy, see supra
notes 24–31 and accompanying text. R
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be able to obtain patent protection with the same ease as today, and with-
out facing any additional obstacles.  Those inventors would be no worse
off if our proposal were adopted.  At the same time, inventors who prefer
more limited protection and cannot get it today would be better off
under our proposal.  This is especially true since, as we explain below,
inventors who opt for quasi-patent or semi-patent protection would re-
ceive benefits in the form of reduced fees, faster examination, and in
some cases, even tax concessions.
The USPTO too has little reason to oppose our proposal.  Adminis-
trative agencies are likely to oppose changes that erode their status or
increase their work burden without adequate compensation.178  This is
not the case here.  Our proposal does not diminish the significance of the
USPTO, nor does it increase or complicate the work of patent examiners.
Because our proposal does not eliminate, or even modify, any of the ex-
isting patentability criteria, it should have no effect on the operations of
the USPTO.  Both quasi-patents and semi-patents retain the basic patent-
ability requirements of novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness.  Hence,
quasi-patent and semi-patent applications will be subject to the same ex-
amination process as traditional patents.  The addition of these protec-
tion forms should have no effect on the workload of patent examiners.
Nor will the introduction of the two proposed forms require any in-
ternal restructuring of the USPTO.  In this sense, our proposal is very
different from the introduction of, say, a new subject matter.  For exam-
ple, the introduction of business methods as a patentable subject matter
in the late 1990s179 forced the USPTO to hire new examiners with the
requisite background to review the applications and to establish a prior
art database.  This transition not only cost the USPTO serious funds, but
also led to harsh criticism,180 cynicism,181 and a tarnished public im-
178. For an analysis of the actions of administrative agencies, see generally Richard A.
Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J. Legal Stud. 305 (1972).  For a
contemporary analysis of the behavior of the USPTO, see generally Lemley, Rational
Ignorance, supra note 7. R
179. For an informative description of the rise of software and business method
patents, see Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 3, 7–14 (2001); see also Sabra Chartrand, Federal
Agency Rethinks Internet Patents, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 2000, at C12 (discussing “Group
705,” a department within USPTO created during the late 1990s to process patents for
software and business methods).
180. See generally Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 7 (discussing criticism R
lodged at USPTO and proposing new explanation for agency’s actions).
181. See Sabra Chartrand, Patents:  Ideas, Advice and Criticism Spring Forth on How,
and Whether, to Grant Patents Involving Software, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1994, at D2
(reporting that in course of USPTO hearings concerning establishment of prior art
database and hiring new examiners, commentators expressed skepticism and lack of
confidence in agency’s ability to make this transition); Evan Ratliff, Patent Upending,
Wired, June 2000, at 208, 210 (portraying website called Patnews, which gained attention
among academics, industry players, and patent examiners for its often cutting critiques of
patent system).
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age.182  Our proposal, by contrast, does not raise any such concerns.  Giv-
ing inventors the option to choose quasi- and semi-patents will not pre-
sent the USPTO with any new challenges and will not necessitate any
meaningful transition.  Moreover, it will not increase the agency’s wor-
kload.  It is important to understand that because quasi- and semi-patents
incorporate the same substantive criteria as traditional patents, there will
be no increase in the number of applications.  There will only be a substi-
tution effect:  Some applicants who would otherwise apply for patents will
instead apply for quasi-patents or semi-patents.183
Our proposal will also benefit the public at large.  As we explained in
Parts II and III, supra, the addition of quasi-patents and semi-patents to
the list of intellectual property forms should lead to more innovation and
superior information sharing, which, in turn, would bring new products
and processes to consumers.  The new protection forms do not exacer-
bate the deadweight loss problem associated with patent protection, nor
do they chill future innovation.  Relative to traditional patents, quasi-
patents and semi-patents improve the public’s lot in its hypothetical bar-
gain with inventors relative to the current baseline of standard patents.184
It is important to emphasize that we view our proposal as a first step
along the way to a more comprehensive patent reform.  Our personal
view is that additional measures should be undertaken to improve the
workings of the patent system.  Other proposals seeking to overhaul the
review process at the USPTO,185 shorten protection periods,186 change
182. See Sabra Chartrand, What’s in a Name?  A Sign of Other Changes at the United
States Patent and Trademark Office, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 2000, at C6 (discussing plans for
substantive and “cosmetic” changes at Patent Office in response to criticism concerning
agency’s handling of software and business method patents); Garfinkel, supra note 31, at R
104 (providing in-depth look at problems in USPTO stemming from software and business
method patents).
183. The only difference our proposal makes for the USPTO is that it would be
required to make some very minor and technical adjustments in its protocols to induce
inventors to select quasi- and semi-patents, per our discussion in Part IV.B, infra.  For
example, the USPTO would be required to adopt differential examination and renewal
fees for the three prototypes.  Likewise, the USPTO may be required to give temporal
priority to quasi- and semi-patent applications in order to guarantee quicker review of such
applications.  While we do not mean to underestimate the possible effect of even minor
changes on the operations of a large agency such as the USPTO, at the end of the day, the
expected impact should be very small.
184. There is one possible objection one might raise against our analysis,
nevertheless.  It could be argued that some of the inducements we suggest to veer
inventors to choose quasi- and semi-patents—specifically, tax benefits—may marginally
harm the public even relative to the patent baseline.  We will deal with this argument in
greater detail in Part IV.B, infra.  Suffice it to say here that we propose that tax breaks
should be used very circumspectly and only in special cases.  Hence, the cost for the public
is likely to be minimal, and, in any case, it is likely to be far outweighed by the benefit.
185. See supra Part I.B.
186. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. R
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patentability requirements,187 or make patent law more technology spe-
cific,188 have considerable merit in our opinion and should receive seri-
ous consideration.  At the same time, such proposals are likely to gener-
ate staunch opposition either on the part of inventors and industry
participants or on the part of the USPTO.  The more extreme a proposal
is, the more likely it is to meet with opposition from one interest group or
another.  In that sense, the modest nature of our proposal is probably
one of its virtues.
B. Reshaping Inventors’ Preferences
In the previous section, we explained why our proposal stands a
chance of being enacted.  However, the legal formalization of quasi- and
semi-patent rights will not accomplish anything unless inventors would
select these intellectual property forms over standard patents.  Hence, it
is important to convince inventors to opt into our proposed regimes.  But
why would any inventor prefer limited protections over more expansive
ones?  In the proceeding discussion, we explore two important reasons
that may lead inventors to choose quasi- or semi-patents over standard
patents:  ideology and monetary incentives.  We discuss each motivation
in turn.
1. Ideology. — Monetary rewards are not the sole impetus for human
action.189  In some contexts, ideology may be an equally powerful motiva-
tion.  The successes of the nonprofit organization, Creative Commons,
and the open source movement are testaments to this fact.  Both projects
are predicated on the view that “information wants to be free.”190
Thousands have subscribed to this view and have contributed content to
both projects without receiving any monetary rewards.  The same ideolog-
ical or personal preference can prompt inventors to select quasi- or semi-
patent protection—or even no protection at all—over standard patents.
An argument can be made that the success of the open source move-
ment and Creative Commons is of limited usefulness to the realm of in-
novation.  This is because contributions to these projects are often rela-
tively small191 and of little independent value.192  The production of
patentable innovations, by contrast, often requires considerable invest-
187. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, A Patent Commercialization
Requirement (Apr. 30, 2009) (unpublished prospectus) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
188. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. R
189. See Benkler, supra note 7, at 423–34 (discussing diverse motivations behind R
human action).
190. R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free:  Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 995, 1029–33 (2003).
191. See Benkler, supra note 7, at 379 (emphasizing importance of breaking up R
projects into small assignments).
192. See id. at 435 (noting “relatively small independent value” of “fine-grained
contributions” to large-scale peer productions).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\111-2\COL201.txt unknown Seq: 42  4-MAR-11 8:04
248 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 111:207
ment of time and money.  Accordingly, one could argue that it is unrealis-
tic to expect inventors to cede any protection voluntarily.
Although we do not deny the fact that the average open source or
Creative Commons contribution is more limited in scope and scale than
the effort necessary to produce a patentable invention, we posit that this
does not spell doom for quasi- and semi-patents.  It must be borne in
mind that some of the contributors to the open source movement have
expended considerable resources on the projects.  Linus Torvalds, for
one, invested large amounts of time and money to produce and supervise
development of the Linux kernel.193  The fact that all contributions to
the Linux operating system are currently covered by a license that in-
cludes patentable inventions is indicative of this.194  Many other pioneers
of both the open source and Creative Commons movements, such as
Richard Stallman and Larry Lessig, have shared the same philosophy that
motivated Torvalds.195  We believe that a similar spirit will attract many
inventors to adopt quasi- and semi-patents.
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that choosing a quasi- or
semi-patent does not imply complete loss of protection.  The sacrifice in-
volved in selecting either protection form over a traditional patent is
much smaller than the sacrifice made by the founders of open source
projects.  Inventors who opt for a quasi- or semi-patent should be able, in
most cases, to recoup their investments and even make a profit.
One possible way to further motivate inventors to choose quasi- and
semi-patent protection is to adopt a rule that all follow-on inventors will
have to choose the same protection form.  Under this rule, if inventor A
chose to protect her invention by a quasi-patent and years later, inventor
B came up with an improvement to the original invention, B would not
be able to seek traditional patent protection for the improvement.  In-
stead, B would have to file for a quasi-patent.  Under this regime—which
mirrors the basic principle of open source196—each quasi- or semi-patent
will serve as a kernel or seed capable of sprouting many additional quasi-
or semi-patents.  The adoption of this rule will increase the attractiveness
193. Steven Weber, The Success of Open Source 99–101 (2004) (describing how
Linus Torvalds developed first working kernel of Linux Operating System in late 1990 and
early 1991, and went on to shepherd the project for years—importantly, making key
decision to adopt the GNU General Public License in January 1992).
194. The latest version of the GNU General Public License—likely the most popular
free software license in use today—conveys a broad scope of patent rights to licensees.  In
fact, the agreement extends to patent claims that have not yet issued.  See supra note 100 R
and accompanying text (discussing “viral licensing” mechanism of GNU General Public
License).
195. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas 53–54 (2001) (describing how
Torvald and Stallman’s individual creations were combined to create free GNU/Linux
operating system).
196. See supra note 100 (discussing viral nature of GNU General Public License); see R
also supra note 102 (discussing potential limitations of this concept in domain of quasi- R
patents).
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of quasi- and semi-patents to inventors who ponder the possibility of
choosing one of the regimes since it assures them that by restricting their
own protection, they will force all follow-on inventors to be subject to the
same restrictions.  The creation of a network of quasi- and semi-patents
will thus generate two salutary effects:  First, it will increase the ideologi-
cal gratification inventors receive from selecting these modes of protec-
tion; second, it will guarantee inventors who chose quasi- or semi-patent
protection broader use privileges with respect to future improvements of
their own inventions.197
2. Monetary Incentives. — It is of course possible that ideology alone
will not produce an adequate number of quasi- and semi-patents.  In the
absence of real world experimentation, it is impossible to predict how
many inventors will voluntarily choose quasi- or semi-patent protection.
We believe some will.  But how many is not a question that can be an-
swered in the abstract.  We are fully aware some may be skeptical that
ideology alone can underwrite a successful launch of quasi- and semi-pat-
ents.  Ideology, however, should not be relied on as the only incentive to
choose either of the two new forms of intellectual property protection.  It
is possible to complement ideological motivations with direct and indi-
rect monetary incentives.  The measures we discuss in the paragraphs that
follow are intended to increase the attractiveness of quasi- and semi-pat-
ents relative to standard patents.  Such measures may include lower filing
fees, shorter examination periods, fewer renewal requirements, longer
protection periods, and even tax benefits.  It is also possible to offer in-
ventors various combinations of these measures.
The simplest and most straightforward incentive that may be offered
to inventors is lower filing fees.  The basic filing fee currently stands at
$330.198  However, various additional fees may be tacked on if the exami-
nation process does not go smoothly and the application does not get
approved on the first attempt.199  Moreover, if an application is ultimately
197. The latter effect is not strictly ideological and should be thought of as an indirect
monetary incentive.  Essentially, the effect is analogous to a limited form of insurance.  See
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Reaching Through the Genome, in Perspectives on Properties of
the Human Genome Project 209, 225 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (discussing power of grant-
back provisions in patent licenses to facilitate exchanges between patent holders and
downstream innovators).
198. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Fee Schedule:  Effective October 2, 2008
[hereinafter Fee Schedule], at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2009
september15.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (requiring small entities to pay
only one-half of this amount—i.e., $165); cf. Revision of Patent Fees for Fiscal Year 2009,
73 Fed. Reg. 47,534, 47,537–38 (Aug. 14, 2008) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 41) (listing
slightly lower rates for FY2009).
199. The patent application process often resembles a dialogue between examiner
and inventor, rather than a single definitive ruling by a tribunal.  After receiving and
comparing a new patent application against known prior art, an examiner may supply the
applicant with an “office action” explaining the reasons for rejecting certain claims.  These
reasons may include, for instance, failure to meet the statutory requirements of novelty and
nonobviousness, as required under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2006).  The applicant may then
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approved, the applicant must pay an issue fee of $1,510.200  Waiving—or
at least lowering—these fees for quasi- and semi-patent applications may
induce inventors to prefer these forms of protection.  Admittedly, the sav-
ings to inventors from the adoption of this measure would be quite insig-
nificant relative to the total cost of protection.201  Yet, even minor savings
can make a difference especially for small and academic inventors since
the cost saving occurs at a very early stage when inventors do not yet know
whether their inventions will achieve commercial success.
A different, yet related, measure that may be used to steer inventors
toward quasi- and semi-patents is to guarantee shorter examination peri-
ods for these forms of protection relative to standard patents.  Presently,
it takes the USPTO between 14 months and 4 years to complete the ex-
amination process,202 with an average time of 34.6 months.203  Expedit-
ing the examination of quasi- and semi-patent applications may provide a
useful and cost-effective way to influence inventor choices.  For example,
if the USPTO were to adopt a rule under which the examination of all
quasi- and semi-patent applications would be completed in 12 months, it
could significantly increase the number of quasi- and semi-patent applica-
tions.  Like the rest of us, inventors are eager to see the examination pro-
cess come to an end.  In addition, receiving the protection earlier should
increase revenues from licensing and litigation.
A third measure that may boost the relative attractiveness of quasi-
and semi-patents to inventors concerns renewal fees.  Standard patents
are subject to renewal fees.  Patentees must renew protection three times
during the life of a patent.  The first renewal fee at the amount of $980 is
due 3.5 years after the issuance of the patent, the second at the amount
of $2,480 is assessed 7.5 years after the date of the grant, and the third at
the amount of $4,110 is levied 11.5 years after the date of issuance.204
Requiring quasi- and semi-patentees to renew only once during the pro-
tection term and lowering the one-time fee to a few hundred dollars may,
amend the offending claims or portions of the specification, and resubmit the revised
application to the examiner for review.  This back and forth may continue for some time
before a final decision is rendered.
200. See Fee Schedule, supra note 198 (requiring small entities to only pay one-half R
this amount—i.e., $755).
201. There is some disagreement as to the total cost of obtaining a patent, but the
average amount is placed between $10,000 and $30,000.  See Lemley, Rational Ignorance,
supra note 7, at 1498–99 (placing total cost of prosecution at $20,000); Masur, supra note R
10 (manuscript at 2) (“[A]n inventor will spend approximately $22,000 to obtain a R
patent.”).
202. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, On Line Chat Transcripts FAQs, at
http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/independent/chats/faq/transcriptsf_m.jsp (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (last modified July 31, 2010).
203. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report 14
(2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2009/2009annualreport.
pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
204. Fee Schedule, supra note 198. R
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at the margin, lead inventors to forgo full patent protection and suffice
themselves with more limited intellectual property rights.
A fourth way to prod inventors in the direction of quasi- and semi-
patents is to offer a longer protection term to inventions protected in
either manner.  Utility patents currently enjoy a protection term of
twenty years from the date of filing.205  It is possible, therefore, to attach a
protection term of twenty-five years to quasi- and semi-patents to compen-
sate inventors for the loss of protection in the case of quasi-patents, or to
reward them for their willingness to share information in the case of
semi-patents.  Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer have shown that it may be
socially desirable to prolong the patent protection terms and simultane-
ously restrict the scope of protection.206  The economic intuition behind
this result is that a longer but less socially harmful protection is superior
to a shorter but more harmful one.  Hence, Ayres and Klemperer sug-
gested that we should chip away at patentees’ exclusivity and compensate
them by granting them longer protection.
Although neither quasi- nor semi-patents reduce the deadweight loss
associated with patent protection,207 both protection modes generate
other beneficial social effects in the form of additional innovation and
improved information sharing.  Depending on the magnitude of those
benefits and the size of the cost of prolonged protection, it may be so-
cially desirable to accord longer protection to quasi- and semi-patents.
Given the current state of knowledge (or more precisely, lack thereof) we
cannot recommend with confidence that quasi- and semi-patents should
be given longer protection.  We only wish to flag this possibility and
would advise policymakers to proceed with caution.
A fifth and final way to influence inventors’ choices is to offer tax
breaks to inventors who select to protect their inventions by a quasi- or
semi-patent.  Tax benefits are often used to induce socially desirable be-
havior.  The case of conservation easements is instructive.  To encourage
preservation of important environmental amenities on private land, al-
most all states allow private property owners to restrict their use of the
land by granting a nonpossessory negative easement in the land to the
government—or, more typically, an environmental nonprofit organiza-
205. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
206. See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without
Reducing Innovation Incentives:  The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive
Remedies, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 985, 986–88 (1999) (contending social welfare may be
improved under legal regime that grants patentees longer protection periods but denies
patentees ability to secure injunctions and forces them to share a certain percentage of
their markets with competitors).
207. This is because neither form has any effect on production levels of patented
products and processes.  Hence, neither form has an effect on the price charged to
consumers.
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tion—in exchange for tax benefits.208  By granting the easement, the
owner voluntarily restricts the scope of her property protection, commit-
ting not to harm certain socially valuable characteristics of the prop-
erty.209  Similarly, it is possible to use tax benefits to reward inventors who
choose to restrict the scope of their intellectual property protection in a
way that benefits third parties.
Yet, we posit that tax benefits should be sparsely used in the present
context.  Granting tax breaks to all inventors who opt in to quasi- and
semi-patent protection may induce inventors, depending on the size of
the tax break, to file for quasi- or semi-patent protection for valueless or
even spurious inventions in order to receive the tax benefits.  The upshot
will be a net social loss:  Society will be deprived of valuable tax revenues
without getting anything in return.  Hence, tax breaks should be reserved
only for inventors with multiple quasi- and semi-patents over inventions
that achieved commercial success.210
CONCLUSION
Somewhat ironically, in recent years, we have witnessed a great deal
of innovation in the area of copyright law and none at all in the field of
patent law.  The rise of Creative Commons and the open source move-
ment allowed copyright owners to choose among multiple forms of copy-
right protection, and to a large degree, tailor legal protections to their
specific needs.  Copyright owners can select among full legal protection,
no protection, and multiple intermediate positions, such as protection
against commercial users only.  No such choice currently exists with re-
spect to patent protection.  Inventors have to suffice themselves with a
binary all-or-nothing choice; at present, there is no legal mechanism that
affords inventors more tailored protection.
In this Article, we sought to rectify this problem by offering two new
opt-in regimes—quasi- and semi-patents—to inventors.  We designed
both regimes with the ultimate goal of increasing the rate of innovation
in our society.  Our first regime, a quasi-patent, would offer inventors pro-
tection only against direct competitors, allowing the rest of the world to
use the invention with impunity.  The second, a semi-patent, retains the
same scope of protection as regular patents; however, it conditions the
grant of protection on disclosure of all research information pertaining
to the claimed invention.  Although the two proposed regimes differ in
their design, both aim at facilitating subsequent innovation by reducing
the taxing effect of patents on future inventors.  Quasi-patents achieve
this goal by restricting the enforcement rights of their holders.  Semi-
208. See Bell & Parchomovsky, Property in Three Dimensions, supra note 84, at R
1054–55 (discussing use of conservation easements to bar socially undesirable uses of
land).
209. Id.
210. Although commercial success is not a perfect proxy for social value, it is the best
proxy we have.
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patents advance it by dramatically improving the available information
about existing inventions.
As this Article shows, both opt-in regimes may be readily introduced
privately via broad licensing agreements that govern collaborative re-
search enterprises.  This implementation model largely tracks the evolu-
tionary path of the open source movement.  Yet, to achieve maximum
effect, it would be necessary to complement private implementation with
public recognition.  One of the functions of the state is to provide ideal
“property packages,” and to redefine existing property rights in order to
adjust them to changing social needs.211  Formalization of quasi- and
semi-patents and their incorporation into a tripartite menu of protection
forms may, on its own, prompt inventors to select either form over stan-
dard patent protection.  Supplementing formal recognition with simple
incentives, such as lower examination fees and fewer renewal require-
ments for quasi- and semi-patents, may induce their wide-scale adoption
and turn them into viable alternatives to standard patents.  The introduc-
tion of quasi- and semi-patents clearly will not solve all the problems of
our patent system.  This much is granted.  But our analysis of quasi- and
semi-patents indicates that they present a real opportunity to improve the
workings of the patent system at a very low cost to society.
211. See Bell & Parchomovsky, Property in Three Dimensions, supra note 84, at R
1030–33 (discussing importance of public orderings of property in circumstances where
transaction costs associated with private orderings of property are prohibitively high).
